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The law grants patents to inventors and copyrights to authors to 
encourage investments in technological and cultural innovation.  
While addressing an appropriability problem faced by innovators, 
these intellectual property rights create a different problem by 
supplying rightsholders with powerful weapons against end-users, 
direct competitors, and follow-on innovators who seek to bring 
socially beneficial innovations to market.  To promote progress, 
intellectual property law must strike a balance, providing sufficient 
incentives for innovation without unduly stifling the efforts of follow-
on innovators or the liberties of end-users. 
In the law, balance usually calls for context sensitivity.  However, 
intellectual property law protects the owner of each patented 
invention and each copyrighted work of authorship with a largely 
uniform set of exclusive rights.1  Historically, this uniformity may have 
been justified in light of the relative homogeneity of market 
conditions applicable to protected subject matter.2  Technological 
progress since the creation of intellectual property rights has led to 
considerable growth in the range of inventions and expressive works 
                                                 
 1. There are exceptions and qualifications to the claim that patent and 
copyright owners, respectively, enjoy uniform rights.  Nonetheless, as the discussion 
in Part II demonstrates, the law does not differentiate the scope or duration of rights 
granted on the basis of subject matter, level of investment, or any other metric.  Infra 
Part II.  For purposes of this Article, discussion of “intellectual property” is shorthand 
for patent and copyright law.  Trademark, trade secret, rights of publicity and other 
rights in information present related but different features that require separate 
analysis beyond the scope of this Article. 
 2. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (current version 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (2000)) (extending protection only to “maps, charts, and books”).   
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to which patent and copyright law apply, respectively.3  In the modern 
context, it is clear that innovators’ needs for intellectual property 
protection vary substantially across industries and among types of 
innovation.4  Applying a socially costly, uniform solution to problems 
of differing magnitudes means that the law necessarily imposes 
uniformity cost by underprotecting those who invest, or would invest, 
in certain costly innovations and overprotecting those with low 
innovation costs or access to alternative appropriability mechanisms.5 
Legal scholars recently have begun analyzing the problem of 
uniformity cost in patent law.  Professor Glynn Lunney, Jr. argues that 
uniformity cost is the key to understanding the economic structure of 
patent law and that recent doctrinal changes affecting the scope of 
patents demonstrate this point.6 Further raising the prominence of 
the problem, Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley argue that 
uniformity cost is particularly high in relation to patent law’s 
                                                 
 3. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology Specific?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1159 (2002) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Technology-
Specific?] (“The ‘useful arts’ envisioned by the Framers were mechanical inventions 
useful in a primarily agrarian economy.”).  Historically, copyright law regulated the 
publishing business.  See also infra notes 127-137 and accompanying text (charting 
expansion of copyrightable subject matter); see also Note, Exploitative Publishers, 
Untrustworthy Systems, and the Dream of a Digital Revolution for Artists, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
2438, 2438 (2001) (noting how digital technology has led to a “crisis in copyright”). 
 4. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1575, 1581-83 (2003) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers] (comparing the 
pharmaceutical industry which requires a large research and development (“R&D”) 
budget to the computer software industry which can operate on a much smaller 
budget). 
 5. See, e.g., id. at 1584-85 (explaining that patent protection may not benefit 
inventions which are impossible to imitate).  Additionally, while market forces drive 
patent protection, some inventors may pursue non-economic objectives such as 
prestige, prizes, and job promotion.  Id. at 1586.  Furthermore, government subsidies 
for innovation, for example, through the National Science Foundation and the 
National Institutes of Health, offer an alternative to patent protection.  Id. at 1586-87. 
 6. See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme 
Court:   A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Lunney, Quiet 
Revolution] (discussing uniformity costs in patent protection and arguing that 
uniformity in patent protection undermines high cost innovation).  Professor 
Lunney’s colleague Professor Christopher Cotropia has further extended this line of 
analysis.  See Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent 
Scope, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 152 (2005) [hereinafter Cotropia, “After-
Arising”] (arguing that while after-arising equivalents protection is needed, it should 
be “tailored to rapidly developing cumulative technology industries”); Christopher A. 
Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation and Information Costs, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57, 
82-90 (2005) (discussing how minimizing informational costs in claim interpretation 
promotes a clearer understanding of the boundaries of an invention’s patent 
protection); Christopher A.  Cotropia, “Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in 
Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 286-302 (2003), reprinted in 36 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 209, 243-59 (2004) (discussing how the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Holmes allows for the development of non-uniform patent law). 
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application to software and biotechnology, and that these costs can 
be reduced by differential application of the Patent Act.7 
Building on this prior work, this Article generalizes the problem to 
include copyright law and advances an analytical, a descriptive, and a 
normative claim with respect to the problem of uniformity cost.  First, 
if one accepts the standard economic justification for intellectual 
property rights, one must accept that exclusive rights must promise 
some potential power over price to induce innovation.  One must 
also accept that different innovators require different kinds of 
promises from the law.  From this premise follows the 
underappreciated conclusion that perfectly tailored rights that 
promise innovators only the expected value required to induce 
socially desirable innovation would be theoretically optimal8 if 
intellectual property rights were the only policy tool available to 
promote innovation. 
Intellectual property law falls short of this ideal for a host of 
reasons including uncertainty about innovation, information 
asymmetries between policymakers and innovators, administrative 
costs of tailoring, and the political economy of intellectual property 
policymaking.  The law’s inability to achieve this ideal imposes 
uniformity costs on society.  While all laws impose some uniformity 
cost because they are inevitably overinclusive or underinclusive in 
some respects, uniformity cost matters from a pragmatic perspective 
when initial entitlement allocations cannot readily be realigned to 
accord with social commitments to allocative efficiency, distributive 
justice, and personal autonomy.  Part I explains why initial allocations 
in patent and copyright law are not readily realigned and why, 
therefore, the problem of uniformity cost in intellectual property law 
is substantial. 
Second, a descriptive account of contemporary patent and 
copyright law in Part II demonstrates that the problem of uniformity 
cost is embedded in the standard entitlements granted under each 
body of law.  However, the discussion in Part III demonstrates that 
two features of these formally uniform rights can function, and do 
                                                 
 7. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 54 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 691, 695-706 (2004) (discussing the stringent disclosure standards for 
patents in the biotechnology industry); Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 4, at 
1689 (recommending that software patent policy should be reformed with respect to 
the obviousness doctrine and disclosure requirements on the doctrine of 
equivalents); Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific?, supra note 3, at 1158-85 (discussing 
heterogeneity in patent law). 
 8. See infra note 55 and accompanying text (qualifying this Article’s claim 
concerning optimality in general and optimality of tailored rights in particular). 
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function to some extent, to reduce uniformity cost:   (1) real options 
that regulate who acquires, and who keeps, intellectual property 
rights;9 and (2) flexible standards that define rights to promote 
context-sensitive application of the law.10  Contemporary law also 
includes provisions that have been legislatively tailored, and in a 
separate paper, I analyze the tailoring of intellectual property rights 
as a strategy for reducing uniformity cost.11 
Finally, this Article closes by claiming that the theoretical and 
descriptive accounts lead to the conclusion that uniformity cost is the 
central problem that intellectual property law must manage.  There 
are substantial pragmatic arguments that favor uniformity in the 
current policymaking environment, but as uniformity cost rises with 
the growing economic importance of, and variation among, 
information-centric industries, policymakers should strive harder to 
maximize context-sensitivity in intellectual property law.  By making 
uniformity cost the focus of economic analysis of intellectual property 
law and by analyzing two important features of entitlement design 
that can be deployed to reduce uniformity cost, this Article supplies a 
general framework for analyzing the economic stakes in a range of 
policy debates in contemporary intellectual property law. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF UNIFORMITY COST 
Intellectual property rights impose social costs because they 
interfere with competitive distribution of information goods.12  From 
a dynamic perspective, some distortion must be tolerated as the price 
for having the information created in the first place.13  The social 
costs that matter, then, are not all static deadweight losses, but only 
the distortions caused by rights that are more or less robust than 
necessary to have induced investments in innovation that deliver a 
                                                 
 9. See infra Part III.A (arguing that real options can promote social welfare in 
some circumstances). 
 10. See infra Part III.B (discussing how flexibility can reduce uniformity costs by 
customizing protection for different contexts). 
 11. Michael W. Carroll, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century (unpublished 
draft Apr. 2005) (on file with author). 
 12. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 74-76 (2003) (explaining that copyright protection is 
needed to offset the costs of others copying inventions but adding that too much 
protection causes market inefficiencies).  The authors explain that the social 
desirability of patent protection depends on the patentee’s fixed costs and how easy 
it is for competitors to work around the patent, but that the patent system fails to 
take these two factors into consideration, which in turn, leads to social costs.  Id. at 
297-310. 
 13. See id. (illustrating that a deadweight loss in the market for copies is caused 
because greater copyright protection increases the price of a copy while decreasing 
the number of copies sold). 
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net benefit to society.  Uniform intellectual property rights 
necessarily impose such costs.  This Part demonstrates this point by 
revisiting the standard economic justification for intellectual property 
rights and then by reorienting this analysis around the problem of 
uniformity cost. 
This reorientation reveals that the theoretically optimal policy, if 
intellectual property rights were the only feasible response to 
underproduction of valuable information, would be to fashion 
perfectly tailored rights rather than to promote perfect price 
discrimination, as some theorists suggest.14  While perfect tailoring is 
just as elusive as perfect price discrimination, the uniformity cost 
perspective shows that the focus of policy analysis should be on how 
intellectual property rights can be rendered more context sensitive.  
Further, this theoretical reorientation emphasizes the role of “law” in 
the law and economics of intellectual property because even after 
economic analysis identifies industries or technologies for which 
uniformity costs are particularly high, legal scholars must assess 
whether legal institutions can competently address this problem. 
A. Standard Economic Justification for Intellectual Property Rights 
Intellectual property rights are a second-best solution to an 
“appropriability problem.”15  The now familiar utilitarian justification 
for intellectual property law starts with Thomas Jefferson’s 
observation that information’s “peculiar character . . . is that no one 
possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of 
it . . . . [H]e who lights his taper at mine, receives light without 
darkening me.”16  For Jefferson, the capacity for information to 
“freely spread from one to another over the globe” is “benevolently 
designed by nature.”17  For the economist, however, given that 
information is a public good, its “benevolent” design poses a 
problem.18  To the extent that pecuniary motivation drives 
                                                 
 14. See id. at 39-40 (contending that perfect price discrimination is not feasible 
given the difficulty in obtaining the required information about consumer 
preferences). 
 15. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1, 12-14 (2005) (explaining that since intellectual property are public goods, 
others would be able to copy inventions without first paying the related research and 
development costs). 
 16. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 3 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 42-43 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 108-09 (3d ed. 
2000) (explaining that public goods can be consumed without depletion 
(non-rivalrous consumption) and can be withheld from nonpaying beneficiaries only 
at prohibitive cost (non-excludability)); see also Wilfried Ver Eecke, Public Goods:   An 
CARROLL.OFFTOPRINTER 5/20/2006  1:46:49 PM 
2006] ONE FOR ALL 851 
innovation, we should not expect to see useful information19 
produced unless the producer can recoup his or her investment.20  
Producers, acting alone, cannot rely on competitive markets to supply 
a sufficient return to make the investment in producing such 
information worthwhile because the distribution of valuable 
information cannot be controlled in the same ways scarce goods can, 
given information’s non-rival nature.21  The government’s response 
has been to grant and to administer rights under patent and 
copyright law.22  Such rights give the innovator the power to exclude 
or inhibit direct competition, which yields potential power over 
price.23  If demand is sufficient, the innovator can use that power to 
earn a positive return on investments in innovation.24 
                                                 
Ideal Concept, 28 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 46 (1999) (identifying at least thirteen 
economic problems related to public goods:   “(1) decreasing costs in production, 
(2) externalities, (3) joint supply, (4) nonexclusion, (5) nonrejectability, (6) benefit 
spillovers, (7) unenforceability of compensation, (8) indivisibility, 
(9) nonappropriability, . . . (10) nonrivalness, . . . (11) free rider possibility, 
(12) multiple user good, [and] (13) lumpiness” (citations omitted).  Information is 
imperfectly excludable and its non-rivalrous quality makes it “problematic”). 
 19. The terms “valuable” and “useful” information in this Article refer to 
information that is costly to produce and that members of our society find to be 
useful, informative, enriching, or otherwise of value.  Such information includes the 
ideas and expressions or embodiments of those ideas found in, for example, novels, 
movies, music, methods for manufacturing useful articles (medicines, computers, 
clothing, etcetera), and computer software. 
 20. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 989, 994 (1997) [hereinafter Lemley, Economics of Improvement] (“In a 
private market economy, individuals will not invest in invention or creation . . . 
unless they can reasonably expect to make a profit from the endeavor.”); Christian 
Koboldt, Intellectual Property and Optimal Copyright Protection, 19 J. CULTURAL ECON. 
131, 134-35 (1995) (noting that copyright protection provides incentives for the 
creation of inventions). 
 21. See, e.g., CARL SHAPIRO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES:   A STRATEGIC 
GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 3 (1999) [hereinafter SHAPRIO & VARIAN, 
INFORMATION RULES] (explaining that “[i]nformation is costly to produce but cheap to 
reproduce”); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 622 (3d ed. 1990) (arguing that innovators must be given 
some monopoly power in order to recoup high start-up costs); Mark A. Lemley, 
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1054-55 (2005) 
[hereinafter Lemley, Free Riding] (contending that the competitive market for 
information will result in an underproduction of inventions); Ian E. Novos & 
Michael Waldman, The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection:   An Analytic Approach, 92 
J. POL. ECON. 236, 237 (1984) (illuminating the problem of free riding in the 
software industry because of software’s nonrival nature). 
 22. See generally supra note 2 (discussing the history and evolution of intellectual 
property law); The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000). 
 23. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 74-76 (explaining the effect of 
copyright protection on the price and quantity of copies and on social welfare). 
 24. See, e.g., id., supra note 12, at 76-79 (demonstrating the effect of patent 
protection on price and profit).  While an increase in copyright protection increases 
residual demand for the product, if the elasticity of residual demand sufficiently 
declines, equilibrium output may decrease.  Id. at 79. 
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While addressing underproduction, intellectual property rights 
also impose social costs.  Professor Lemley nicely summarizes these as 
follows: 
First, intellectual property rights distort markets away from the 
competitive norm, and therefore create static inefficiencies in the 
form of deadweight losses.  Second, intellectual property rights 
interfere with the ability of other creators to work, and therefore 
create dynamic inefficiencies. Third, the prospect of intellectual 
property rights encourages rent-seeking behavior that is socially 
wasteful.  Fourth, enforcement of intellectual property rights 
imposes administrative costs.  Finally, overinvestment in research 
and development is itself distortionary.25 
B. The Problem of Uniformity Cost 
Economic analysts generally agree that these social costs must be 
minimized, and intellectual property rights should be no more robust 
than necessary to induce the desired level of investment in cultural 
and technological innovation.26  However, in both the economic and 
the law and economics literature, the problem of social cost in 
intellectual property law often is discussed at a very high level of 
abstraction.  The literature surrounding the optimal length of a 
patent is a typical example.  Neoclassical economic models 
concerning an optimal patent term often hold that optimality is 
conditional, recognizing that efficiency might dictate varying terms 
from patent to patent.27 Other analysts make the point more 
                                                 
 25. Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 21, at 1058-59. 
 26. See, e.g., Lunney, Quiet Revolution, supra note 6, at 5 (arguing that patent 
protection should be provided only to the “precise extent[] necessary to secure each 
individual innovation’s ex ante expected profitability” and acknowledging that this 
level will have to account for unsuccessful research efforts); William W. Fisher III, 
Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1249 (1998) (arguing 
that the goal of copyright law is to “give creators enough entitlements to induce 
them to produce the works from which we all benefit but no more”).  The canonical 
version of this argument was voiced by Lord Macaulay, who argued that a grant of 
copyright was a grant of an evil monopoly and that “[f]or the sake of the good we 
must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to last a day longer than is necessary 
for the purpose of securing the good.”  Thomas Babington Macaulay, Speech in the 
House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF THOMAS BABINGTON 
MACAULAY 241 (Sully & Kleinteich eds., Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1900). 
 Professor John Duffy argues that the mobility of capital makes analysis of the 
causal connection between rights and investment levels unstable.  John F. Duffy, 
Intellectual Property Isolationism And The Average Cost Thesis, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1077, 1078-
89 (2005).  But see Mark A. Lemley, What’s Different About Intellectual Property?, 83 TEX. 
L. REV. 1077, 1102-03 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, What’s Different?] (responding that 
because intellectual property rights distort the market away from competitive 
equilibrium, entry will not necessarily compete away supracompetitive returns). 
 27. See infra notes 186-188 and accompanying text (discussing economic 
literature on patent length). 
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explicitly.28  But these economists offer no suggestion for how variable 
patent terms might be implemented, and those who contemplate the 
matter find the administrative difficulties intractable.  This literature 
points out the problem of uniformity cost in intellectual property law.29  
While economic analysis can help identify situations in which 
uniformity cost is particularly high, it will require pragmatic legal 
analysis to identify ways in which the legal system can competently 
redress the problem. 
1.  The problem 
Legal scholars only recently have begun to analyze the social costs 
of uniform rights as a general problem in intellectual property law.  
Analyzing U.S. patent law, Professor Lunney has advanced a formal 
economic model of uniformity cost that assesses the trade-offs 
between strictly uniform rights, rights tailored to individual 
innovations, and certain intermediate options.30  At bottom he shows 
that “[e]ven where an innovative product represents the most 
valuable use of available resources . . . an optimal uniform scheme of 
protection will provide protection that will leave some desirable 
innovative products unprofitable.”31 
To illustrate the point, imagine four innovations, A, B, C, and D.  
These could be musical compositions, types of business software, 
biotechnological inventions, or chemical compounds with 
                                                 
 28. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (discussing recognition of 
uniformity cost in the literature). 
 29. See Lunney, Quiet Revolution, supra note 6, at 5-6 (stating that uniformity costs 
rise as the gap between the optimal uniform level of protection and the level needed 
for individual innovation increases).  See generally Francesca Cornelli & Mark 
Schankerman, Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives, 30 RAND J. OF ECON. 197, 197 
(1999) (“A uniform patent life provides too much R&D incentive to low-productivity 
firms and too little incentive to high-productivity ones.”). 
 30. See Lunney, Quiet Revolution, supra note 6, at 39-56 (illustrating that uniform 
protection forces regulators to choose between encouraging innovation at the cost of 
social welfare while an individualized protection scheme requires additional 
administrative and information costs); see also  Cornelli & Schankerman, supra note 
29, at 197 (arguing that an optimum patent scheme can be achieved through various 
patent renewal fees); Wendy A. Adams, Intellectual Property Infringement in Global 
Networks:   The Implication of Protection Ahead of the Curve, 10 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 71, 
79-80 (2002) (noting that the ideal amount of patent protection requires a complex 
analysis of a state’s economic and technological capacity). 
 31. See Lunney, Quiet Revolution, supra note 6, at 50-51 (arguing that excluding 
otherwise desirable innovations would be advantageous when the benefits of doing 
so are outweighed by the costs involved in excluding or extending protection to 
preexisting innovations); see also Bruce Abramson, Promoting Innovation in the Software 
Industry:   A First Principles Approach to Intellectual Property Reform, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. 
L. 75, 107 (illustrating that second-generation products may not reach the market if 
the patent holder of a first-generation product refuses to cooperate with another 
innovator who holds a block patent on the improvement to the first-generation 
product). 
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pharmacological uses.  Society places a value of fifty on each of these 
if it is available for use and is free from any intellectual property 
rights.  Assume that intellectual property rights apply uniformly to all 
covered forms of information and can be calibrated to yield levels of 
protection ranging from zero to three. Innovations B-D will require a 
level of protection above zero to be created and distributed, so that A 
alone will be created and distributed at zero, A and B will be created 
and distributed at level one, and so on.  As protection increases, 
however, social value decreases because some users are priced out of 
desired uses for which they would pay more than marginal cost.32  
Assume that each increase in the level of protection reduces the 
social value of each innovation by ten.  Sliding the protection lever 








0 A 50 
1 A, B 80 
2 A, B, C 90 
3 A, B, C, D 80 
 
A policymaker interested in maximizing social value from 
intellectual property rights but bound by the uniformity condition 
would set the level of protection at two, leaving innovation D 
unprofitable even though society places a net positive value of twenty 
on having it created.  Within this highly stylized example, it is easy to 
see that if the uniformity condition could be relaxed, it would be 
possible to adjust rights to entice the creation of A-D by, for example, 
eliminating protection for A and reducing the scope or duration of 
rights granted to B. 
Some empirical data suggest that the social costs of protecting 
innovations such as A are not merely hypothetical. Edwin Mansfield 
interviewed research and development managers from 100 randomly 
selected firms to ask what percentage of each firm’s inventions would 
have been developed and brought to market in the absence of patent 
protection.33  Although any counterfactual query introduces certain 
                                                 
 32. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 18, at 21 (explaining that marginal cost is the 
cost associated with increasing an additional unit of output or production); id. at 300 
(illustrating that social costs are the costs imposed on society due to private conduct, 
such as having accidents). 
 33. See Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation:   An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. 
SCI. 173 (1986) (exploring how much innovation would decline without patent 
protection and to what extent firms make use of the patent system).  In 1994, Wesley 
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biases and uncertainties, especially when posed to interested parties, 
Mansfield’s data indicate that:   (1) a significant percentage of 
inventions would have been developed and brought to market 
without the prospect of patent protection; (2) this effect varies 
significantly by industry; and (3) the availability of protection resulted 
in eighty percent of patentable inventions being patented in 
industries with high patent-dependencies (pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals, petroleum, machinery, and fabricated metal products) 
and sixty percent of inventions being patented in less patent-
dependent industries (primary metals, electrical equipment, 
instruments, office equipment, motor vehicles, rubber, and textiles).34 
Similar results have been found in the semiconductor manufacturing 
industry.35 
In fact, the problem of uniformity cost is potentially far more 
significant than the example above suggests.  The distribution of 
rewards from both cultural and technological innovation is highly 
skew.36  For example, uncertainty about demand or about feasibility 
leads recording companies, motion picture studios, pharmaceutical 
companies, and biotechnology research firms to invest millions of 
                                                 
Cohen randomly surveyed R&D lab managers on their methods of protecting patents 
and received responses from 1,478 labs.  Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their 
Intellectual Assets:   Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or 
Not) 1-4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000) 
[hereinafter Cohen et al., Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent], available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.  Of the firms surveyed, most viewed patents as 
the least important in securing profits on an invention.  Id. at 1; see also Richard C. 
Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 1987 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 793-99 (surveying R&D managers about 
the efficacy of patents and finding that respondents rated patents as the least 
effective method of appropriation and preferred other devices to protect returns on 
investments). 
 34. Mansfield, supra note 33, at 175-76. 
 35. See Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Don’t Fence Me In:  Fragmented Markets for 
Technology and the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms, 50 MGMT. SCI. 804 (2004) 
(explaining rise in defensive patenting in semiconductor industry); Bronwyn H. Hall 
& Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited:  An Empirical Study of 
Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. OF ECON. 101, 104-
05 (2001) (summarizing findings indicating that patents are ineffective as solutions 
to appropriability in the industry and increases in patenting explained by other 
factors). 
 36. See, e.g., F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 4-7 
(Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al., eds. 2001) (collecting data showing that vast 
majority of profit data was clustered in the range of low profit values but that the 
distribution also had a long range of high values); F.M. Scherer, Dietmar Harrhoff & 
Jörg Kukies, Uncertainty and the Size Distribution of Rewards from Innovation, 10 J. 
EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 175, 175-79 (2000) (showing through an empirical study that 
eighty-one to eighty-five percent of U.S. patents were in the top ten percent value 
shares). 
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dollars that will never be recouped in innovation.37  In these 
industries, profits from chart-topping songs, blockbuster movies, and 
blockbuster drugs must be sufficient to cover the losses incurred on 
other investments.38  Consequently, industries such as these demand 
robust intellectual property rights to maximize the profitability of 
successful innovations.  When these rights apply uniformly, the social 
costs are magnified. 
2. Uniformity cost typology 
Uniformity costs can be categorized as Type I or Type II.  Type I 
uniformity costs arise when the creators of the same class of subject 
matter face different magnitudes or types of the appropriability 
problem.  For example, in the absence of copyright, some composers 
would still create new music whereas others may pursue a different 
line of work.  The public would benefit if copyright applied to only 
music created by the latter group.39  Instead, under U.S. copyright law 
all music is protected by the same entitlement.40  Even when some 
copyright incentives are needed, the magnitude of that need varies 
based on the time, effort, and capital at risk or the incentives may be 
needed to solve different kinds of problems.  With respect to 
software, for example, open source programmers rely on rights under 
copyright to prohibit private appropriation of common-pool software 
whereas many commercial software producers rely on copyright to 
prohibit unauthorized public appropriation of privately held 
software.41  Copyright law, however, treats all software as literary works 
and supplies the same rights to both groups.42 
                                                 
 37. See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield et al., Social and Private Rates of Return from Industrial 
Innovations, 91 Q. J. ECON.  221, 233-34 (1977) (stating that the median private rate of 
return for the innovations studied was twenty-five percent). 
 38. See, e.g., Arthur S. DeVany & W. David Walls, Motion Picture Profit, the Stable 
Paretian Hypothesis, and the Curse of the Superstar, 28 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 
1035, 1039-40 (2004) (estimating from gross profit data over a thirteen year span that 
only twenty-two percent of movies made were profitable and of those, thirty-five 
percent made eighty percent of the total profits earned); Henry Grabowski, Patents 
and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries 14 
(Working paper 2002), available at http://www.econ.duke.edu/Papers/Other/Grabo 
wski/Patents.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (finding that “the search for blockbuster 
drugs is what drives the R&D process in pharmaceuticals” and that “[t]he median 
new drug does not cover the R&D costs of the average compound”). 
 39. A more thorough welfare analysis would include, among other things, the 
disaffection costs imposed on unprotected composers from being treated differently 
than protected composers. 
 40. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2000) (“musical works, including any 
accompanying words”); id. § 102(a)(7) (“sound recordings”); id. § 106 (enumerating 
types of available rights). 
 41. Compare David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 241, 242 (2001) (describing that while the GNU/Linux operating system 
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Type II uniformity costs also arise out of variable appropriability 
problems.  Even when all creators within an industry or technological 
field face roughly the same type and magnitude of appropriability 
problem, the magnitude and type of problem will certainly vary 
among industries and technological fields.43  Nonetheless, patent law 
grants the same entitlement to inventors of pharmaceutical drugs 
and novelty toys, and copyright law grants roughly the same 
entitlement to, for example, authors of novels and computer 
programs.  This uniformity highlights the imprecision of current 
intellectual property law. 
3. Qualifying the problem 
Granting uniform entitlements in patent and copyright law 
necessarily will impose some Type I and Type II costs, and the 
question for policymakers is how best to reduce these costs.  The 
magnitude of social costs incurred when the government rewards all 
innovators with the same entitlement depends on the currency used.  
If the government were to grant a uniform monetary entitlement to 
all inventors—say a bounty of $1 million—whether their invention 
were a life-saving biomedical device or a novelty toy, the social costs 
of uniformity would be apparent and such a system would be grossly 
inefficient. 
Policymakers have chosen to grant legal rather than monetary 
entitlements to innovators.  Uniform exclusive rights are not 
immediately problematic because three market-based features of the 
intellectual property system reduce uniformity cost:   demand 
                                                 
is copyrighted, the persons and firms who own the rights use them to further the 
goals of the open source community, namely that the software “may be freely copied, 
modified, and distributed, but only if the modifications (derivative works) are 
distributed on these terms as well”), with Microsoft’s Software Piracy Protection 
Home Page, http://www.microsoft.com/piracy (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (providing 
information on piracy including how to report it to Microsoft). 
 42. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining literary works as “works, other than 
audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical 
symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books, 
periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are 
embodied”); see also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 
1988) (noting that Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1976 with the intention 
of including software in the definition of literary works). 
 43. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information 
Dissemination:   How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 486 (2003) (“Our patent laws are one-size-fits-all, applying 
essentially the same rules to biopharmaceutical research that apply to automotive 
engineering, information technology, semiconductors, and rocket science.  But the 
needs of these fields for patent protection differ.”); Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, 
supra note 4, at 1584 (“Appropriability is itself an amalgam of a complex set of 
variables, many of which are themselves industry-specific.”). 
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elasticity, price discrimination, and Coasean bargaining.  The social 
costs of intellectual property rights arise only when there is demand 
for protected information.  If demand for a novelty toy that would 
have been invented in the absence of protection is zero, then even 
though granting uniform patent rights was unnecessary, uniformity 
cost is zero because no potential buyers have been excluded.44  
Uniformity costs rise with demand.45 
Even when these uniformity costs arise, under traditional economic 
analysis, perfect price discrimination theoretically would eliminate the 
underdistribution of protected information.  That is, static 
deadweight loss would be zero if intellectual property owners were 
able to fully engage in first-degree price discrimination, such as 
selling or licensing to each user willing to pay more than marginal 
cost.46  As others have shown, however, even as a matter of theory, 
perfect price discrimination would not eliminate all social costs of 
intellectual property rights.47  Moreover, even if perfect price 
discrimination would theoretically avoid reduction in social value, 
perfect first-degree price discrimination in the intellectual property 
                                                 
 44. See Patently Silly, http://www.patentlysilly.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) 
(identifying such low-demand inventions).  Of course, demand for the invention 
does not refer to only demand in product markets.  Any potential user of 
information for which a patent owner might make a credible threat must be plotted 
on the invention’s demand curve. 
 45. Increases in demand for a work also attract free riding competitors so that 
increases in demand increase both the magnitude of the appropriability problem 
and the magnitude of social cost.  See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. Reexamining Copyright’s 
Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 557 (1996) (pointing out that 
narrowing copyright protection necessarily reduces incentives to innovate along with 
deadweight loss).  Although we should expect rising demand to generate correlated 
offsetting effects in many cases, when creators of popular works do not require the 
power over price that patent or copyright promise, uniformity costs rise. 
 46. See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES, supra note 21 at 39; Harold 
Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J. L. & ECON. 293, 303-04 (1970) 
(positing that no single price in the market for privately produced public goods can 
satisfy equilibrium requirements). 
 47. Economists have become less certain about the theoretical efficiency of 
perfect price discrimination by natural monopolists or firms engaged in 
monopolistic competition.  See, e.g., V. Bhaskar & Ted To, Is Perfect Price Discrimination 
Really Efficient? An Analysis Of Free Entry, 35 RAND J. OF ECON. 762, 775 (2004); Aaron 
S. Edlin et al., Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient?:   Welfare and Existence in 
General Equilibrium, 66 ECONOMETRICA 897 (1998) (arguing that the efficiency of 
price discrimination may be undermined by excessive entry of firms into the 
market).  Moreover, many attempts to modify intellectual property law to enhance 
opportunities for price discrimination likely are undesirable. See generally Julie E. 
Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000); Michael J. 
Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001) 
[hereinafter Meurer, Price Discrimination]; Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory 
Of Infrastructure And Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 978-80 (2005) 
(discussing distortionary effects of promoting price discrimination). 
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context is a practical impossibility.48  The real question is whether 
policymakers should design intellectual property entitlements to 
facilitate price discrimination so as to reduce uniformity cost.  As 
Michael Meurer has shown, some forms of price discrimination are 
socially beneficial and others are socially harmful.49  Consequently, 
even when the law can encourage price discrimination, the problem 
of uniformity cost reemerges with respect to the need to tailor 
entitlements to promote only beneficial price discrimination. 
Finally, when demand is positive and price discrimination is 
imperfect, the Coase Theorem asserts that uniformity cost will affect 
allocative efficiency only if reallocation or reapportionment of 
uniform entitlements by contract is too costly.50  Commentators 
disagree about the general magnitude of transaction costs in 
intellectual property sales and licensing, but all would agree that the 
costs are greater than zero.51  Indeed, most agree that difficulties in 
valuing patents and copyrights raise transaction costs to the point 
that allocative efficiency will depend upon the content of intellectual 
property entitlements.52 This is particularly true because the 
                                                 
 48. See, e.g., Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 21, at 1059 n.115; Christopher S. Yoo, 
Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 255 (2004) (noting that 
entry of firms will eventually eliminate all supracompetitive profits); Daniel A.  
Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, Why (and How) Fairness Matters at the IP/Antitrust 
Interface, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1817, 1867 (2003) (adding that imperfect price 
discrimination can have negative consequences). 
 49. See generally Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 47, at 90-94 (arguing that 
in some circumstances, price discrimination is efficient because it makes producers 
better off without making consumers worse off but in other circumstances, it is not 
efficent because while producers are better off, total surplus is reduced); Michael J. 
Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy:   Copyright Protection of Digital 
Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 869, 894 (1997) (noting that price discrimination allows 
sellers to generate more revenue but is more likely to induce buyers to band together 
to share digital goods in order to arbitrage against differential pricing). 
 50. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 16 (1960) (“In 
these conditions [of high transaction costs] the initial delimitation of legal rights 
does have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system operates.”); see 
also Cooter & Ulen, supra note 18, at 82-87 (explaining that the Coase theorem posits 
that in the absence of transaction costs, all allocations are efficient because private 
parties will bargain to internalize externalities).  While arguing that policymakers 
should recognize the effects they have on allocative efficiency when fashioning legal 
rights for high transaction cost environments, Coase also recognized that 
distributional justice matters and that “the choice between different social 
arrangements for the solution of economic problems should be carried out in 
broader terms than this [maximizing total output] and that the total effect of these 
arrangements in all spheres of life should be taken into account.”  Coase, supra note 
50, at 43. 
 51. See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2661 (1994) [hereinafter Merges, Of Property Rules] (“Despite a 
few brave attempts to assume away the obvious, those who have considered the 
application of the Coase theorem to IPRs have noted the pervasive presence of 
transaction costs.”). 
 52. See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Proprietary Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter, 49 
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externalities that justify patent and copyright law differ 
fundamentally from those that inspired Coase,53 and the law’s choice 
is not between granting an entitlement to party A or to party B but 
between granting an entitlement to party A or to the public at large, 
comprised of an unknown and often unknowable proportion of 
higher and lower-valued users.54 Consequently, allocative inefficiency 
in intellectual property law potentially imposes a far more significant 
social cost than it does with respect to real property. 
Thus, even after demand elasticity, price discrimination, and 
Coasean bargaining have been accounted for, if the law grants 
uniform intellectual property rights, society pays too much for 
numerous innovations that would be created with less robust 
protection, and the optimal level55 of protection must be set lower 
than is necessary to induce the creation of certain costly but socially 
desirable innovations.56 
The uniformity-cost perspective calls for a reorientation in the 
economic analysis of intellectual property law.  Those who argue that 
perfect price discrimination alone would be a complete solution to 
                                                 
EMORY L.J. 823, 828-29 (2000) (arguing that uncertainty in valuation of patents on 
basic research tools is likely to block efficient licensing of such tools); Nancy Gallini 
& Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Propery:   When is it the Best Incentive System?, in 2 
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 67 (Adam Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (“The optimal 
design of IP depends importantly on the ease with which rights holders can contract 
around conflicts in rights.”); Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 20, at 1053 
(analyzing components of transaction costs and concluding that “[t]he result of all 
these factors is that the transaction costs of intellectual property licenses are 
significant”); James Bessen, Holdup and Licensing of Cumulative Innovations With Private 
Information, 82 ECON. LTRS. 321, 326 (2004) (showing that “[t]he possibility of ex ante 
licensing does not eliminate the problem of holdup in cumulative innovation”). 
 53. See, e.g., Merges, Of Property Rules, supra note 51, at 2657-64 (highlighting that 
it is more difficult to identify the existence and severity of externalities in the context 
of intellectual property than in physical property); Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 21, 
at 1054-55; Lemley, What’s Different?, supra note 26, at 1098-1102 (noting that creating 
intellectual property rights is more likely to have positive externalities and greater 
costs than creating real property rights).  See generally Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus 
Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004) [hereinafter 
Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post] (comparing traditional and new justifications for 
intellectual property rights). 
 54. See generally Frischmann, supra note 47, at 939-80 (discussing a variety of 
demand-side considerations for information resources). 
 55. In my view, interpersonal and intrapersonal incommensurability problems 
make the notion of an optimal level of protection incoherent.  Nonetheless, the case 
for some level of protection is persuasive for at least some forms of information.  
Those who share my doubts about the utility of optimality analysis should understand 
“optimal level” to mean the level of protection that democratically-representative 
policymakers would choose to bring about a desired amount of investment in 
innovation, recognizing the incommensurable interests that are sacrificed with each 
change in the level of protection. 
 56. See Lunney, Quiet Revolution, supra note 6, at 50-51 (arguing that this 
conclusion helps explain why products such as business methods and clothing 
designs are traditionally excluded from patent and trademark protection). 
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the social costs of intellectual property rights err.  In fact, if 
intellectual property rights were the only available solution to the 
underproduction problem, the ideal implementation would be 
perfectly tailored rights57—i.e. rights that promised the expected 
value necessary to induce investment in only socially-desirable 
innovations. 
II. UNIFORMITY AND ITS LIMITS IN U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
As is true in most areas of law, intellectual property entitlements 
fall far short of the theoretically desirable design.  This Part describes 
the current state of patent and copyright law, showing that the 
entitlements are largely uniform and that recent changes have 
exacerbated the problem of uniformity cost.  Before turning to the 
specifics of U.S. intellectual property law, a few preliminary remarks 
concerning the general design of intellectual property rights and the 
difference between uniform and tailored rights are in order. 
Intellectual property rights have three dimensions:   subject matter, 
scope, and duration.  The subject matter of intellectual property 
potentially is all information.58  Scope defines the actions that the 
rightholder may engage in lawfully with respect to protected subject 
matter, the actions of others for which the rightholder may seek legal 
redress, and the remedial rules specifying available redress.59  
Duration is a relevant dimension because the U.S. Constitution 
requires that federal patent and copyright rights be limited in time.60 
                                                 
 57. The claim for perfect tailoring is qualified because if policymakers had 
sufficient information about expected value so as to perfectly tailor rights, a more 
efficient policy response to underproduction would be to pay innovators directly for 
the costs of innovation while leaving the costs of distribution to competitive markets. 
See, e.g., Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post, supra note 53, at 135 (2004) (characterizing 
intellectual property rights as a “necessary evil” and arguing that the default 
preference in a market economy is to leave distribution to competitive markets).  
Nonetheless, if the policymaker’s options are restricted to the creation of exclusive 
rights, perfectly tailored rights are superior to a regime of uniform rights with 
perfect price discrimination because dynamic inefficiencies would be eliminated as 
well. 
 58. See, e.g., Thomas Cottier & Marion Panizzon, Legal Perspectives on Traditional 
Knowledge:   The Case for Intellectual Property Protection, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 371, 382-84 
(2004) (asserting that information that intellectual property protects should be 
interpreted broadly to include information that can create economic gain, such as 
traditional knowledge). 
 59. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry Into The Merits Of Copyright:   The 
Challenges Of Consistency, Consent, And Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 
1356 (1989) (using Hohfeldian entitlement schema to describe scope of rights under 
copyright). 
 60. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress power to secure exclusive 
rights for authors and inventors for “limited Times”). 
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Intellectual property rights are “uniform” when the subject matter 
is broadly defined and the scope and duration of rights is the same 
for all protected subject matter.61  Rights are “tailored” when scope or 
duration varies depending either on the classification of the work or 
invention along industry-specific or technology-specific lines, say, as 
computer software, or classification of the initial rightholder (e.g., 
whether the rightholder was a government employee or used public 
funds to create the protected information).62  Rights can be, and have 
been, tailored along a continuum of abstraction. 
In the most abstract sense, all intellectual property law has been 
tailored because its subject matter does not include all information.  
Even when the law makes some distinction between protected and 
public domain information, that distinction could be captured by a 
single set of intellectual property rights.63  From this perspective, 
differences in the rights granted by copyright and patent law, 
respectively, represent a form of tailored protection driven by the 
relative differences in functionality and expressiveness in patentable 
and copyrightable subject matter.64  For purposes of this Article, the 
baseline for measuring uniformity will be the now-traditional 
copyright/patent distinction:   Rights are “uniform” if the standard 
rights under patent or copyright apply and are “tailored” if these 
rights have been varied for particular subject matter or for particular 
initial rightsholders. 
Five sources of law specify the degree of uniformity for U.S. 
intellectual property rights:   (1) the U.S. Constitution, 
                                                 
 61. See Lunney, Quiet Revolution, supra note 6, at 6 (stating that if uniform rights 
are given over information they must be narrowly tailored “to a particular instance 
where the incentives available from a market . . . leave a significant gap between an 
innovative product’s expected desirability, relative to alternative uses of the 
resources, and its expected profitability”). 
 62. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000) (“Copyright protection under this title is not 
available for any work of the United States Government, but the United States 
Government is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it 
by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.”). 
 63. During the Renaissance, for example, the scope and duration of royal 
privileges or letters patent granted to publishers and inventors were quite similar.  
See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway?:   How We Came To View Musical 
Expression As A Form Of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405, 1407-08 (2004) (surveying 
historical literature and giving examples in Western history of how music became the 
subject of proprietary claims). 
 64. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35 
CONN. L. REV. 439, 524 (2003) (arguing that digital technology creates pressure on 
the information/function distinction between copyrightable and patentable subject 
matter); see also Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 
465, 466 (2004) [hereinafter Long, Information Costs] (arguing that patent and 
copyright bundle distinct entitlements because of differing costs of conveying 
information about the protected subject matter). 
CARROLL.OFFTOPRINTER 5/20/2006  1:46:49 PM 
2006] ONE FOR ALL 863 
(2) international obligations, (3) statutory entitlements, (4) judicial 
opinions refining the contours of those entitlements, and 
(5) administrative adjudicatory and regulatory interpretations of 
those entitlements.  The Constitution grants Congress the power to 
enact patent and copyright laws,65 and Congress has provided some 
form of patent and copyright protection since 1790.66  More recently, 
the United States has committed itself to exercise that constitutional 
authority subject to copyright-specific and patent-specific multilateral, 
international agreements administered by the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (“WIPO”).67  Overarching and reinforcing the 
obligations under WIPO agreements are those the United States has 
accepted as a party to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
                                                 
 65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 66. See Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (Apr. 10, 1790) (current version at 
35 U.S.C. §§ 100-05 (2000)) (detailing the process by which a patent or trademark 
could be applied for and granted). 
 67. The copyright-specific agreements to which the United States is a party are:  
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 
1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 211 (last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971) 
[hereinafter Berne Convention], the Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 
6 U.S.T. 2731, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 
Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter WPPT], and the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 
[hereinafter WCT]. 
The United States also is party to narrower agreements offering tailored 
protections with respect to specific forms of expression or modes of delivery. See, e.g., 
the Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals 
Transmitted by Satellite, May 21, 1974, art. 2(1), 13 I.L.M. 1444 (obligating member 
states to regulate satellite transmission); The Convention for the Protection of 
Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, 
Oct. 29, 1971, art. 2, 25 U.S.T. 309, 866 U.N.T.S. 67 (obligating member states to 
protect phonogram producers against the making and importation of unauthorized 
duplications). 
The patent-specific agreements to which the United States is a party are:   the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 
626 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; the Patent Cooperation Treaty, 
June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter PCT]; and the 
Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the International Patent Classification, Mar. 24, 
1971, 26 U.S.T. 1793.  The United States also has signed but not ratified the Patent 
Law Treaty, June 1, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1047, which entered into force in Member States 
on April 28, 2005.  The United States also is party to agreements specifying tailored 
procedural requirements.  Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the 
Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure, Apr. 28, 1977, 32 
U.S.T. 1241, 1861 U.N.T.S. 361. 
The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction to resolve disputes under the 
principal substantive agreements, the Berne Convention (copyright) and the Paris 
Convention (patent), but that jurisdiction has yet to be invoked.  See GRAEME B. 
DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 45 
(LexisNexis 2001); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Property Litigation:   A Vehicle 
For Resurgent Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429 (2001) [hereinafter “Int’l 
IP Litigation”] (stating that the International Court of Justice has jurisdiction to 
resolve disputes arising under both conventions, but no parties have invoked this 
jurisdiction to date). 
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Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”).68  The current statutory 
entitlements reside in the Patent Act of 1952, as amended,69 and the 
Copyright Act of 1976, as amended.70  The federal courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction to enforce these entitlements,71 with the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the United States 
Supreme Court sharing exclusive appellate jurisdiction over well-pled 
complaints arising under the Patent Act.72  Finally, the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) has administrative 
responsibility for examining and issuing patents pursuant to the 
Patent Act;73 whereas, the United States Copyright Office issues 
copyright registrations, subject to minimal examination, and 
performs other tasks delegated by the Copyright Act.74 
A. The Constitutional Framework 
Patent and copyright law find constitutional legitimacy in the grant 
of power “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
                                                 
 68. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].  As a matter of 
substantive law, the TRIPS Agreement primarily incorporates the essential 
requirements of the Berne Convention for copyrights and the Paris Convention for 
patents, as revised, but the enforcement mechanism under the TRIPS Agreement is 
far more effective.  The TRIPS Agreement is administered by the TRIPS Council of 
the World Trade Organization.  See Dinwoodie et al., supra note 67, at 45-47.  
Disputes under the TRIPS Agreement are subject to the WTO’s dispute settlement 
procedure and are subject to review by the WTO’s Appellate Body.  Id. 
These obligations apply only to how member States treat innovators or innovations 
from other member States.  Congress can depart from uniformity without violating 
these obligations if such departures apply only to works created by United States 
innovators.  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 411 (applying a registration requirement in 
copyright law only to U.S. works); see also infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text 
(discussing this registration requirement). 
 69. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (2000)). 
 70. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-806 (2000). 
 71. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000) (“The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, 
plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be 
exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright 
cases.”). 
 72. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 
832-33 (2002) (applying well-pleaded complaint rule to “arising under” jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1338). 
 73. See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure, § 1309 (8th ed. 2001, 4th rev. 2005), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web 
/offices/pac/mpep/documents/1300_1309.htm#sect1309 (detailing the process by 
which electronic information submitted for the issuance of a patent is handled and 
processed). 
 74. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 104(A)(e)(1)(A)(i) (describing the process by which a 
notice can be filed with the Copyright Office to enforce a restored copyright). 
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right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”75  For purposes of 
this Article, the important question is whether Clause 8 requires or 
prohibits uniform rights under patent or copyright.  In general, the 
Constitution grants policymakers wide discretion to address the 
problem of uniformity cost in intellectual property law. 
1. Subject matter 
The Court has inferred constitutional subject matter limitations 
from Clause 8’s reference to “[a]uthors” and their “[w]ritings” and 
“[i]nventors” and their “[d]iscoveries.”  “[W]ritings” should be 
understood broadly,76 but a creative work that has not been expressed 
in any tangible form would fail to qualify as copyrightable subject 
matter.77  In addition, from the terms “[a]uthors” and “[w]ritings,” 
the Court has inferred that copyright requires a modicum of 
creativity and may not extend to unoriginal writings, such as factual 
compilations organized in an obvious manner.78 
With respect to patent law, the Court has asserted, as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, that laws of nature, natural phenomenon, 
and abstract ideas are unpatentable.79  Whether there is a 
                                                 
 75. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  This Constitutional provision lacks a consensus 
designation among courts or commentators.  For some, it is the “Copyright and 
Patent Clause.” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192 (2003).  For others it is the 
“Patent and Copyright Clause.”  Id. at 214 n.20.  Others prefer the more textual 
“Exclusive Rights Clause.”  Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA 
L. Rev. 1057, 1068 (2001). Many others refer to it as the “Intellectual Property” 
Clause.  See, e.g., Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: 
The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
1119.  In the interests of scholarly and judicial consensus, it shall be referred to 
hereinafter, however inelegantly, as “Clause 8,” since we can all agree that the 
provision is the eighth clause in Article I.  See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 
562 (1972) (using “Clause 8”). 
 76. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561 (holding that the term writing includes, “any 
physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor”); Burrow-
Giles Lithographic v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (stating that Clause 8 “Writings” 
include “all forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, by which the ideas in the 
mind of the author are given visible expression”). Potentially, the term “writing” 
imposes a “minimum size” principle on fixed expression eligible for copyright. Cf. 
Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. (2005) 
(proposing minimum size principle to explain absence of copyright protection for 
“microworks”). 
 77. See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 423-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(stating that unfixed works are not constitutional “writings”); KISS Catalog v. 
Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 831 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“If ‘writings’ 
continues to exist as a constitutional limit, live performances cannot be within the 
scope of that term.”). 
 78. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361-63 (1991) 
(holding that a telephone directory’s information organized without any original 
characteristics does not meet the Constitutional requirements of copyright). 
 79. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“A principle, in the 
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be 
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constitutional foundation for this assertion may be tested in future 
cases.80  At least one commentator has suggested a more restrictive 
reading of Clause 8, asserting that “useful [a]rts” is the relevant 
subject matter limitation and that it limits the discoveries that patent 
law can protect to those related to technology, in contradistinction to 
innovations in the traditional liberal and fine arts.81  The Court does 
not seem to be receptive to such arguments, however. 
2. Scope 
The Constitution empowers Congress to “secure” the “exclusive 
right” to a writing or discovery.82  To date, the courts have not had 
reason to define the limits of Congress’s power to define the scope of 
an author’s or inventor’s exclusive right, although one Justice has 
asserted that the text of the Constitution does impose such a limit.83  
Presumably the text imposes some nexus requirement between the 
right granted and the writing or discovery to which the right relates, 
but the courts have not specified how close this nexus must be.  With 
respect to uniformity, the text might support an argument that the 
grant of power to secure “the” exclusive right requires that if 
Congress enacts patent or copyright legislation, it must extend the 
same right to all inventors or authors, respectively; however, little in 
the history or structure of Clause 8 supports this reading. 
                                                 
patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.” (quoting Le Roy 
v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852))). 
 80. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 181, 193 (2003) (“[W]e should expect sporadic agitation for a property right 
in a (mere) idea—because the winners are identifiable and the exploitation of the 
idea will often not identifiably impede on an existing set of easily organized holders 
of property rights.”); see also Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the 
Mind: An “Idea” Whose Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 703 (2006) (proposing such 
expansion). 
 81. See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 
1139, 1164 (1999) (arguing that the few materials available suggest that the Framers 
did not intend to have every created thing be covered by Clause 8). 
 82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 8. 
 83. See United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 320 (1948) (Douglas, J., 
concurring): 
Congress has much to say as to the pattern of our economic organization.  
But I am not clear that Congress could expand “the exclusive right” specified 
in the Constitution into a right of inventors to utilize through a price-fixing 
combination the production and marketing facilities of competitors to 
protect their own high costs of production and eliminate or suppress 
competition.  It is not apparent that any such restriction or condition 
promotes the progress of science and the useful arts. 
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3. Duration 
Patents or copyrights may be “secured” only for “limited Times.”84  
At a minimum, this means that Congress may not make the term of 
patent or copyright protection perpetual,85 the wishes of some 
legislators notwithstanding.86  The Court’s current interpretation of 
the constitutional limit is that Congress does not violate the “limited 
Times” constraint by retrospectively extending the terms of subsisting 
copyrights and patents so long as the extended term has a defined 
end.87  Additionally, the Court has suggested that Congress may not 
extend protection to protected subject matter for which the limited 
time of protection has expired,88 although lower courts recently have 
rejected that understanding.89 
In addition to these explicit subject matter, scope, and duration 
limits, Clause 8 declares that the purpose of the grant of power is “to 
promote the progress of Science and useful Arts.”90  If this “preamble” 
imposes a progress limitation on Congress’s power, it could serve as 
the basis for attacking or promoting uniformity in some 
circumstances.91  Although Congress undoubtedly would have wide 
                                                 
 84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 8. 
 85. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 209 n.16 (2003) (“[T]he 
Constitution ‘clearly precludes Congress from granting unlimited protection for 
copyrighted works.’”) (quoting with approval S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 11 (1996)); 
United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“It is clear that 
the ‘Limited Times’ restriction in the Copyright Clause prohibits Congress from 
granting Copyright protection of perpetual duration.”); KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l 
Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 833 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that perpetual term 
violated “limited Times” requirement). 
 86. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 256 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“After all, the statute was 
named after a Member of Congress, who, the legislative history records, ‘wanted the 
term of copyright protection to last forever.’”) (citation omitted). 
 87. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199 (interpreting “limited” to mean “confined within 
certain bounds,” “restrained,” or “circumscribed” and holding that “a timespan 
appropriately ‘limited’ as applied to future copyrights does not automatically cease to 
be ‘limited’ when applied to existing copyrights”). 
 88. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) 
(“Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove 
existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials 
already available.” (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 
(1966))); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 234 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the extension 
of patent protection to items where the patent had expired is unconstitutional). 
 89. See Luck’s Music, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(distinguishing Graham); Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 WL 
914754, at *3-4 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2005) (appeal filed) (claiming that it is doubtful 
that the basis for the Graham decision could govern copyright cases). 
 90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 91. Whether the current Court reads the preamble to be hortatory or mandatory 
is subject to doubt.  Compare Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-6 (1966) (treating the preamble as 
a substantive limit on Congress=s power), with Eldred, 537 U.S. at 196 (relying on 
petitioners’ concession below that circuit precedent precluded argument that 
progress was a substantive limit while also implicitly treating the progress clause as a 
limitation on congressional action subject to rational basis review).  See also Figueroa 
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discretion to define progress and to determine whether a particular 
legislative measure promotes it,92 at the margins, the progress 
limitation could support an argument that application of uniform 
rights to particular subject matter or in a particular case would so 
clearly impede progress that the rights must be tailored to be 
constitutional. For example, during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, lower courts held that the “progress” limitation 
required that copyright law be tailored to exclude protection for 
immoral subject matter.93 
Legislative or judicial departures from uniformity could implicate 
three other constitutional provisions:   the First Amendment,94 the 
Commerce Clause,95 and the Takings Clause.96  The First 
Amendment’s broad prohibition on content and viewpoint 
discrimination in expression is more likely to constrain Congress’s 
ability to differentiate rights under copyright than patent.97  While the 
Court has expressly acknowledged that the First Amendment imposes 
                                                 
v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 139, 152 (Fed. Cl. 2005) (accepting the progress 
limitation on Congress’s power and holding that diversion of fees from PTO to be 
necessary and proper to promotion of progress). 
 92. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 213 (“The justifications we earlier set out for Congress’s 
enactment of the CTEA . . . provide a rational basis for the conclusion that the CTEA 
‘promote[s] the Progress of Science.’”) (internal citation omitted). 
 93. See Simonton v. Gordon, 12 F.2d 116, 124 (D.C.N.Y. 1925) (holding that 
public policy required denying copyright protection for Ablasphemous, seditious, 
immoral or libelous@ subject matter but that the work at issue was not immoral); see 
also Broder v Zeno Mauvais Music Co., 88 F. 74, 77-79 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898) (holding 
that song “Dora Dean” with lyrics describing woman as “the hottest thing you’ve ever 
seen” not entitled to copyright protection because use of “hot” in this context 
rendered lyrics immoral); Martinetti v Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 922 (C.C. Cal. 1867) 
(No. 9173) (concluding that, consistent with the progress limitation, Congress had 
tailored protection to exclude immoral subject matter by defining protected musical 
compositions as those “suited for public representation”). 
 94. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the ability to “regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes”). 
 96. U.S. CONST. amend. V (forbidding private property to be taken for public 
use, without just compensation). 
 97. With respect to patent law, one could imagine the First Amendment 
furnishing the basis for a successful challenge to a rejection on the grounds of 
“moral utility” assuming that the applicant could find a nexus to protected 
expression either with respect to the invention itself or, perhaps, an expressive 
interest in having the government recognize the inventor qua inventor.  In addition, 
software patents are an area in which the First Amendment may play a role.  See 
generally Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 162 (2000) (arguing that 
First Amendment protections of expressive elements in software patents will pose 
challenge for patent law and concluding that “[i]n patent law, perhaps new doctrines 
can be tailored specifically to the problem of patenting speech”).  Patent law may 
also have to confront other claims of expressive harm as well.  See generally Timothy R. 
Holbrook, Curing Heterosexuality?  Moral Signals and the Potential for Expressive Impacts in 
Patent Law (working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs 
tract_id=702587#PaperDownload.  
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limits on Congress’s power to grant rights under copyright, those 
limits remain largely undefined because, in the current Court’s view, 
doctrines internal to copyright law supply sufficient limits for the 
time being.98  The First Amendment could require tailoring of 
copyright’s exclusive rights to permit unauthorized uses in certain 
cases or classes of case.99  Alternatively, the First Amendment also 
could be used to require uniformity.100 
The Commerce Clause and Takings Clause deserve mention but do 
not warrant extended discussion for present purposes.  Whether the 
Commerce Clause offers Congress an alternative basis to pass 
legislation that would violate the constraints imposed by Clause 8, 
such as protection of unoriginal databases, is a question the Court 
has touched on,101 and is one over which lower courts and 
commentators have engaged in vigorous debate.102  If the Commerce 
                                                 
 98. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (“We recognize that the 
D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights ‘categorically immune 
from challenges under the First Amendment.’  But when, as in this case, Congress 
has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First 
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”).  Nonetheless, the power to enjoin speech 
through a copyright injunction remains potentially problematic.  See SunTrust Bank 
v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165, 1166 (11th Cir. 2001) (dissolving copyright 
infringement injunction on First Amendment grounds), vacated and superseded by 268 
F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom Of 
Speech And Injunctions In Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998) (arguing 
that infringement injunctions should be subjected to constitutional scrutiny). 
 99. See, e.g., MELVILLE, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10[A] (1981) (suggesting 
potential First Amendment defense to copyright infringement) as expanded in 1 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10(D) (2002) 
(extending potential First Amendment defense to instances in which “vital news 
elements will be lost unless the exact language can be quoted”). 
 100. Consider, for example, whether Congress constitutionally could withdraw 
copyright protection from pornographic expression on the theory that the exclusive 
rights serve as an undesirable public subsidy for this form of expression.  See 
Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 922 (C.C. Cal 1867) (No. 9173) (interpreting 
grant of copyright protection as form of public subsidy).  In recent decades, the 
lower courts have rejected the contention that an obscenity exception should be read 
into current copyright law and have suggested that any attempt to so tailor rights 
under copyright may violate the First Amendment. See generally Mitchell Bros. Film 
Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir. 1979) (“We can only 
conclude that we must read the facially all-inclusive 1909 copyright statute as 
containing no explicit or implicit bar to the copyrighting of obscene materials, and 
as therefore providing for the copyright of all creative works, obscene or non-
obscene, that otherwise meet the requirements of the Copyright Act.”); Pillsbury Co. 
v. Milky Way Prods., 1981 WL 1402 *9 n.10 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981) (holding no 
implied obscenity exception to fair use defense). 
 101. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 
(2003) (suggesting that Congress could not rely on Commerce Clause to impose 
attribution requirement on public domain information). 
 102. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1274-77 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(suggesting Congress may protect unfixed sound recordings under Commerce 
Clause).  But see United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 425 (S.D.N.Y 2004) 
(appeal filed) (“Congress may not, if the Copyright Clause does not allow for such 
legislation, enact the law under a separate grant of power, even when that separate 
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Clause is available, then the wide discretion granted Congress to 
regulate interstate commerce would further extend the already broad 
range of tailoring options available under Clause 8.103  Conversely, the 
Takings Clause potentially raises the price of tailored intellectual 
property legislation.  If the federal government, through the 
legislative or executive branch, violates rights under copyright or 
patent, it has consented to be sued for damages in the U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims.104  Similarly, it seems likely that if the government 
were to condemn for public use an individual patent or copyright, 
just compensation would be due under the Takings Clause.105  A far 
                                                 
grant provides proper authority.”); KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. Inc., 350 F. 
Supp. 2d 823, 833 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 425). 
Among commentators, compare Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and 
Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272 (2004) (arguing that Congress may rely 
on other Article I enumerated powers to evade constraints imposed by Clause 8), 
with Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection:   The Role of Judicial 
Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 535, 538-39 (2000) (asserting that the Intellectual Property Clause serves as a 
limit to the extent where Congress can secure exclusive rights in information), Paul 
J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power:   The Intellectual 
Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1177 & 
n.409, Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the 
Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 63-64 (arguing that if Congress 
could pass legislation under the Commerce Clause that it could not under Clause 8, 
it would effectively read Clause 8 out of the Constitution), and William Patry, The 
Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property:   An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 
67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 361 (1999) (claiming that Congress cannot make an end 
run around the Constitutional restriction of Clause 8 by passing legislation under 
another power). 
 103. See supra Part II (discussing in depth the tailoring of intellectual property 
rights). 
 104. 28 U.S.C. § 1498.  With respect to infringement by states, some 
commentators argue that the Takings Clause should supply a remedy.  See, e.g., 
Mitchell N. Berman et al., State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights:   
How to “Fix” Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1072 (2001) 
(stating that state infringements of patents, copyrights, and trademarks are likely 
compensable takings); Shubha Ghosh, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for 
Intellectual Property:   The Path Left Open After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 637 (2000) (arguing that state infringement of intellectual property 
might be remedied by takings suits); Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells, Remedies for the 
Misappropriation of Intellectual Property by State and Municipal Governments Before and 
After Seminole Tribe:  The Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines, 55 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 849, 870-72 (1998) (stating that the intention of the Takings Clause is to 
limit the government’s ability to force an individual to release their interest in 
property and that this intention is implicated when the government uses intangible 
property it does not own). 
 105. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2000) (revoking patent grant for any invention 
useful in connection with atomic weapons and ordering that just compensation be 
paid to patent owners); cf. Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 463 U.S. 1315, 1317 (1983) 
(holding that government-mandated disclosure of trade secrets are compensable 
takings). 
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more contestable issue is whether legislative change to patent or 
copyright law could ever amount to a regulatory taking.106 
In sum, the Constitution imposes few constraints on policymakers’ 
discretion to address the problem of uniformity cost in intellectual 
property law.  The text of the Constitution could support arguments 
requiring tailoring of intellectual property rights in specific 
circumstances and prohibiting it in others.  The cases likely to 
generate such arguments will be rare, and as a general matter, courts 
are likely to be unreceptive to constitutional arguments concerning 
tailored rights under patent or copyright.  Consequently, Congress 
and the courts retain wide discretion in this field. 
B. Patent Law 
In patent law, Congress has used its discretion to grant largely 
uniform rights.  Some features of the law are designed to reduce the 
social costs of this uniformity, but the problem of uniformity cost has 
been exacerbated by recent international commitments that limit 
policymakers’ flexibility.  TRIPS and the Paris Convention generally 
establish a set of uniform patent rights that member states must 
grant, but both agreements either tailor the minimum requirements 
for some subject matter or, more often, grant member states 
discretion to tailor patent rights.  The Patent Act grants largely 
uniform rights, although Congress has exercised its tailoring 
discretion in some important instances. 
1. Subject matter 
TRIPS demands that Member States extend patent rights to “any 
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, 
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable 
of industrial application.”107 Largely tracking this requirement, the 
Patent Act grants utility patent protection for any novel, non-obvious, 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter.108  An invention is “useful” if the invention performs as the 
inventor specifies and if the utility of that performance is specific, 
                                                 
 106. See, e.g., J. Nicholas Bunch, Note, Takings, Judicial Takings, and Patent Law, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 1747, 1790-93 (2005) (applying a regulatory takings analysis to patent 
law). 
 107. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 27(1).  For an argument that U.S. 
patent law is in tension with these uniformity constraints by tailoring on technology-
specific lines, see Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 3, at 1183-85 
(describing the different treatment U.S. law gives to different industries).  Separately, 
the inventor has the right to be identified as such in an issued patent.  Paris 
Convention, supra note 67, art. 4. 
 108. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (2000). 
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substantial, and credible.109  An invention is novel if it is not “known 
or used in this country, or patented or described in a printed 
publication in this or a foreign country.”110 
Non-obviousness is the subject matter doctrine that does the most 
work in striking the incentives/access balance in patent law. An 
invention is unpatentable “if the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the 
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art 
(“PHOSITA”) to which said subject matter pertains.”111  When 
assessing non-obviousness, courts must consider context-specific 
information:   (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) the 
differences between the prior art and the claimed invention, (3) the 
level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, (4) secondary 
considerations such as commercial success and long-felt need in the 
art.112  Commentators generally agree that the Federal Circuit 
elevated the stature of these “secondary” considerations, rendering 
them central to non-obviousness (Section 103) analysis.113 
                                                 
 109. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966) (stating that an invention 
is useful if a “specific benefit exists in a currently available form”).  But see In re Brana, 
51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Usefulness in patent law, and in particular in 
the context of pharmaceutical inventions, necessarily includes the expectation of 
further research and development.”).  The PTO has refined the Brenner 
understanding of utility by requiring the applicant to show “well-established utility” 
for the invention, meaning that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would 
immediately appreciate why the invention itself is useful” and that such utility is 
“specific, substantial, and credible.”  U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Utility 
Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1098 (Jan. 5, 2001); see also Jonathan 
Kahn, What’s The Use?  Law and Authority in Patenting Human Genetic Material, 14 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 435-36 (2003) (discussing competing models of utility in 
comments to PTO).  The Federal Circuit has recently endorsed the PTO’s reading of 
Brenner.  See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1230 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (“The PTO’s standards for assessing whether a claimed invention has a 
specific and substantial utility comport with this court’s interpretation of the utility 
requirement of § 101.”). 
 110. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). See Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, 
Reinventing The Double Helix:   A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the 
Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 386-88 (2002) (arguing that the Patent Act 
imposes two distinct requirements:  “newness” under Section 101 and “novelty” 
under Section 102). 
 111. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). 
 112. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) 
(describing the test for obviousness under § 103 of the United States Code). 
 113. See, e.g., Robert L. Baechtold, How To Sell Nonobviousness and Obviousness, 258 
PRACTICING LAW INST. 511, 527-40 (1988) (“The other great contribution the Federal 
Circuit made to the patentee’s cause was to elevate the considerations of commercial 
success, long felt need, failure of others and copying to major players in the 
determination of obviousness.”); Lunney, Quiet Revolution, supra note 6, at 23-24 
(arguing that the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the secondary considerations has 
made it less likely that a patent is obvious); see also Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View 
Eng’g, Inc., 189 F.3d 1370, 1376, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1948, 1952 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding 
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2. Scope 
The scope of patent rights is defined uniformly for most types of 
invention.  TRIPS requires that the owner of a product patent have 
the exclusive right to prevent third parties, without the owner’s 
consent, from:   making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing 
for these purposes that product.114  The owner of a process patent is 
to have the exclusive right to prevent third parties, without the 
owner’s consent, from the act of using the process, and from the acts 
of:   using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes 
at least the product obtained directly by that process.115  In the United 
States, the scope of patent law has been quite uniform from 
inception.116  A utility patent gives its owner the rights to exclude 
others from:   making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing the 
invention in the United States during the term of protection.117  A few 
statutory exceptions permit certain classes of users to use certain 
types of invention without liability,118 but otherwise patentees all enjoy 
the same rights of exclusion. 
The patent entitlement is protected by both a property and a 
liability rule.  Patent owners are eligible to receive preliminary119 and 
                                                 
that a patent was not obvious under the § 103 considerations); Modine Mfg. Co. v. 
Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 541, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1622, 1624 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(holding that the evidence sustained a finding of nonobviousness); Loctite Corp. v. 
Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 872-73, 228 U.S.P.Q. 90, 98 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding 
reversible error where secondary considerations are ignored in a determination of 
obviousness); Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. v. Con-Agra, Inc., 45 F.3d 443, 448, 35 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1278, 1278-79 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (accepting the District Court’s 
findings that the patent was infringed). 
 114. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 28(1)(a). 
 115. Id. at art. 28(1)(b). 
 116. Compare Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (granting inventor “the sole 
and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using and vending to others 
to be used, the said invention or discovery”), with 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) 
(establishing that anyone who makes, uses, offers to sell, sells, or imports any 
patented invention in the United States during the patent term infringes the patent, 
unless an exception applies). 
 117. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). The exclusive right to offer to sell the invention 
was added in response to the TRIPS Agreement.  See Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 4988 (1994) (adding offer-to-sell 
language to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), (c), (e), and (g)). 
 118. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (permitting the making, using, and selling of patented 
inventions, other than new animal or veterinary products, which are primarily 
manufactured using DNA or other processes solely for uses reasonably related to the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary products). 
 119. See Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1558, 38 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion by granting a preliminary injunction to prevent infringement); see also 
Mykrolis Corp. v. Pall. Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7523, *4-5 (2004) (citing the four 
factors governing preliminary injunctions:   “(1) the movant’s reasonable likelihood 
of success on the merits; (2) the irreparable harm the movant will suffer absent 
preliminary injunctive relief; (3) the balance of hardships tipping in its favor; and 
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permanent injunctive relief.120  The Federal Circuit traditionally has 
presumed that injunctive relief should be granted, but the strength of 
that presumption was the subject of Supreme Court review as of 
January 2006.121  The liability rule that protects the patent entitlement 
sets a “reasonable royalty” as the floor for damages,122 but measuring 
actual damages in litigation has become an increasingly complex and 
costly undertaking.  In general, patent owners seek to be 
compensated by one of three measures:   (1) lost profits, 
(2) reasonable royalty, or (3) a combination of the two.123 
3. Duration 
As a formal matter, the duration of patent rights is quite rigid.  
TRIPS requires that patent rights endure for twenty years from the 
date the patent application was filed.124  The Patent Act implements 
this requirement, adding a condition that the patent owner pay 
maintenance fees at three intervals.125  The term can be adjusted if 
certain kinds of delay in processing a patent application occur.126 
                                                 
(4) the impact of the injunction on the public interest”) (quoting Bio-Tech. Gen. 
Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1558, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 
1996))). 
 120. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000). 
 121. See MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1225, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We therefore see no reason to depart from the general 
rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent 
exceptional circumstances.”), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 733 (2005) (directing parties to 
address “[w]hether this Court should reconsider its precedents, including 
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908), on when it 
is appropriate to grant an injunction against a patent infringer”); see also Trans-World 
Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1565, 224 U.S.P.Q. 259, 268 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (indicating that damages in the form of license fee adequate). 
 122. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 
1544, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (advising that § 284 
indicates only a lower limit of reasonable royalties but foregoing any maximum 
limit); TWM Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899-900, 229 U.S.P.Q. 525, 
528 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (using “Georgia-Pacific” fifteen-factor analysis derived from 
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and aff’d, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
 123. See George F. Pappas, Damages and Remedies for Patent Infringement, SJ018 ALI-
ABA 67, 69 (2003) (indicating the remedies available to patent owners who have 
suffered infringement of a patent). 
 124. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 33. 
 125. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).  Utility patents that issue from applications 
filed on and after December 12, 1980, are subject to the payment of maintenance 
fees necessary to maintain the patent in force.  Fees are due 3 2, 7 2 and 11 2 years 
from the date the patent is granted.  35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2000).  A six-month grace 
period is provided during which the maintenance fee may be paid with a surcharge.  
37 C.F.R. § 1.362(e) (2005).  Failure to pay the current maintenance fee on time may 
result in expiration of the patent. 
 126. 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (2000). 
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C. Copyright Law 
The United States’ treaty obligations impose a baseline of uniform 
rights under copyright that are supplemented by some required 
tailored protections and the option to further tailor rights in a 
number of respects. 
1. Subject matter 
The TRIPS Agreement and the Berne Convention require that 
copyright protection extend to “every production in the literary, 
scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of 
its expression,”127 excluding ideas, procedures, methods of operation, 
or mathematical concepts.128  Unlike patent law, copyright law’s 
subject matter was legislatively tailored until the beginning of the 
twentieth century.  In the Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, 
Congress departed from the tailored approach to subject matter, 
broadly granting copyright to any original work of authorship fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression.129 
The threshold for originality is set as low as the Constitution 
allows.130  A work is “original” if it was created by the author rather 
than copied from another source and if the work reflects a modicum 
of creativity.131  Courts have found such originality in a commercial 
photograph of a vodka bottle,132 in blank forms,133 county tax maps,134 
and have suggested that a seven-note measure in a musical 
composition is potentially original.135  A work meets the fixation 
requirement “when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or 
under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable 
to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated 
for a period of more than transitory duration.”136 
                                                 
 127. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 9(1) (incorporating by reference Berne 
Convention, supra note 67, art. 2(1)). 
 128. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 9(2); see also WCT supra note 67, art. 2. 
 129. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 131. See Feist Pub., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361-63 (1991) 
(finding that Feist’s white pages owe nothing to an act of authorship and thus are not 
original within the meaning of the Constitution); see generally David Nimmer, 
Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls:   Authorship and Originality, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2001) 
(exploring application of originality standard to series of hypothetical cases). 
 132. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 133. Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 134. County of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
 135. Swirsky v. Carey, 371 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 136. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
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2. Scope 
The United States’ international obligations are scattered among 
different agreements.  Broadly speaking, the scope of uniform rights 
includes the exclusive rights to reproduce137 and adapt138 a protected 
work.  In addition, authors of most classes of work for which it would 
matter have the exclusive right to publicly perform, publicly 
communicate, or publicly recite a protected work.139  The scope of 
rights is circumscribed by a user’s privilege to quote the copyrighted 
work.140  The WIPO treaties add an exclusive distribution right,141 and 
require the creation of “paracopyright” protections for digital rights 
management technologies.142  Finally, Berne requires member states 
to enforce moral rights,143 but TRIPS does not incorporate this 
provision.144 
The Copyright Act broadly grants the owner the exclusive rights to 
authorize or (1) to reproduce the work in copies, (2) to adapt the 
work, and (3) to distribute copies of the work.145  These rights extend 
to literal copies of the work and to non-literal copies that are 
substantially similar to the copyright owner’s work.146  The right to 
prepare derivative works also grants the owner the power to 
                                                 
 137. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 9(1) (incorporating by reference Berne 
Convention, supra note 67, art. 9(1)). 
 138. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 9(1) (incorporating by reference Berne 
Convention, supra note 67, art. 8 (translation), art. 12 (general adaptation), art. 
14(1) (cinematographic adaptation)). 
 139. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 9(1) (incorporating by reference 
Berne Convention, supra note 67, art.11(1) (performance of dramatic, dramatico-
musical, and musical works), art. 11 (allowing broadcast or communication by wire 
of artistic or literary works), art. 11 (regarding rules on public recitation and 
communication of literary work), art. 14 (mentioning communication by wire of 
cinematographic works)); see also WCT, supra note 67, art. 8 (establishing a more 
general communication right for literary and artistic works); WIPO Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty art. 14 (creating a “making available” right for owners of 
phonograms).  Member States also have the option to add resale rights (a.k.a. droit de 
suite) in original works of art and original manuscripts. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 
68, art. 9(1) (incorporating by reference Berne Convention, supra note 67, art. 14). 
 140. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 9(1) (incorporating by reference Berne 
Convention, supra note 67, art. 10(1)). 
 141. WCT, supra note 67, art. 6(1); WPPT, supra note 67, art. 12. 
 142. See WCT, supra note 67, arts. 11-12 (explaining the rights available to owners 
of digital copyrights); WPPT, supra note 67, arts. 18-19 (urging additional protections 
to owners of digital copyrights). 
 143. See Berne Convention, supra note 67, art. 6 (defining the concept of moral 
rights for copyright owners). 
 144. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 9(1) (expressly excluding Berne 
Convention, supra note 67, art. 6 from incorporation). 
 145. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
 146. See generally, e.g., Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (1992) 
(indicating that copying of a copyrighted article may be performed directly or 
indirectly and may violate the statute so long as a substantial similarity is shown 
between the original and the offending copy). 
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appropriate without liability any unauthorized improvements that are 
derived from or substantially similar to the copyrighted work.147  In 
the basic entitlement, Congress has tailored scope by extending to 
owners of only certain classes of works the exclusive rights to 
(4) publicly perform,148 or (5) publicly display149 the copyrighted 
work.  Collectively, the exclusive rights under copyright for all classes 
of subject matter are limited by a series of provisions, most notably 
fair use150 and first sale.151 
The copyright entitlement is protected by a property rule and by 
two liability rules.  A copyright owner is entitled to temporary and 
permanent injunctive relief “on such terms as [a court] may deem 
reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.”152  
Liability rule protection comes in two forms.  The copyright owner 
can receive compensation in the form of actual damages.153  These 
include the portion of the infringer’s profits attributable to 
infringement and not otherwise captured in the calculation of 
damages.154  In lieu of actual damages, the copyright owner can elect 
to receive statutory damages in the range of $750 to $30,000 for each 
work infringed, with possible quintupling of the upper bound for 
willful infringement.155 
3. Duration 
Under Berne and TRIPS, a copyright must endure at least as long 
as the life of the author plus fifty years.156  Under the Copyright Act, 
the term of a copyright depends upon its date of creation. 
                                                 
 147. See Anderson v. Stallone, 1989 WL 206431, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (C.D. 
Cal. 1989) (finding that the script was a derivative work and therefore not entitled to 
copyright protection); Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 20, at 1074 
(explaining the concept and rules governing derivative works). 
 148. The general public performance right applies to “literary, musical, dramatic, 
and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual 
works.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).  Sound recordings receive a more limited exclusive right 
of public performance by digital audio transmission. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6). 
 149. The public display right applies to “literary, musical, dramatic, and 
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, 
including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work.”  17 
U.S.C. § 106(5). 
 150. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (detailing the exclusive rights and fair use provisions 
governing copyrights). 
 151. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (explaining the rights of copy owners to sell such copies). 
 152. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). 
 153. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (providing for actual damages against infringer of a 
copyright). 
 154. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). 
 155. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). 
 156. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 12; Berne Convention, supra note 67, 
art. 7(1). 
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Until 1976, copyright law divided duration into two terms.  Works 
created on or after January 1, 1978 are subject to a unitary term.157  
Until 1998, that term coincided with the life-plus-fifty term required 
by the Berne Convention.158  Now, authors receive copyright 
protection from the moment a work of authorship is created until 
seventy years after the author’s death.159  If a work is anonymous, 
pseudonymous, or is a work-made-for-hire, protection lasts for ninety-
five years from the date of publication or 120 years from the date of 
creation.160 
D. Summary 
Both patent and copyright law grant largely uniform exclusive 
rights to inventors and authors, respectively, subject to a number of 
tailored provisions.  The Constitution leaves policymakers free to 
address the problem of uniformity cost in a variety of ways, but recent 
international obligations hem in this discretion considerably.  
Nonetheless, the formally uniform subject matter and scope 
provisions of both patent and copyright require judicial flexibility in 
application which can be used to reduce uniformity cost. 
III. OPTIONS AND STANDARDS AS TOOLS TO REDUCE UNIFORMITY COST 
The analysis in Part I, shows that uniformity cost is the central 
problem for intellectual property policymaking and that perfect 
tailoring of entitlements in patent and copyright law would be 
theoretically optimal if granting exclusive rights were the only policy 
tool available to respond to appropriability problems.  Part II, shows 
that current law imposes constraints on the use of explicit tailoring to 
address uniformity costs.  Consequently, while it is important to 
analyze how and when tailoring can feasibly be used to reduce 
uniformity costs, it is equally important to understand how formal 
uniform rights can be, and have been, designed to reduce uniformity 
costs through use of real options and flexible subject matter and 
scope doctrines. 
                                                 
 157. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (creating a term of the life of an author plus seventy 
years). 
 158. Berne Convention, supra note 67, art. 7(1). 
 159. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).  Until passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, the term of 
copyright was divided into an initial and a renewal term.  See, e.g., Tyler Ochoa, Patent 
and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution:   A Historical Perspective, 49 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF THE U.S.A. 19 (2001) (discussing the terms of copyrights under 
the Constitution). 
 160. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c). 
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A. Real Options 
The default rules for obtaining, enforcing, and maintaining 
intellectual property rights can, and sometimes do, require 
affirmative, costly acts on the part of potential intellectual property 
owners.  Such rules require potential owners to place an option value 
on the prospect of protection.  Patent law, and, to a lesser extent, 
copyright law, use “call options” to reduce uniformity cost by filtering 
who possesses intellectual property entitlements.161 
Policymakers have three choices when allocating entitlements:   
(1) grant the entitlement to all eligible holders, (2) grant an option 
to acquire the entitlement to all eligible holders (a call option), or 
(3) grant multi-tiered options to acquire the entitlement; that is, an 
automatic grant of an option to acquire an option to acquire the full 
entitlement, etcetera.162  Many legal entitlements, perhaps most, are 
in fact options to acquire the entitlement rather than the entitlement 
itself.163  For example, even among rights considered to be 
fundamental, options rather than entitlements are common.  We say 
that a U.S. citizen acquires the “right” to vote in federal elections 
upon reaching the age of majority.164  In fact, she acquires the option 
to have the right to vote, but she does not acquire the right to vote in 
any given election until she exercises the option by registering to 
vote.165 
                                                 
 161. In finance circles, options are divided among “call” and “put” options.  See, 
e.g., Risk Glossary:   Options, available at http://www.riskglossary.com/articles/option. 
htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).  A call option gives the holder the option to purchase 
an asset at a specified price, and a put option gives the holder the option to sell an 
asset at a specified price.  Id.  Option contracts generally include certain temporal 
constraints, such as date on which the option expires or constraints on when the 
option may be exercised.  See id. (distinguishing among American (exercise any time 
up to expiration date), European (exercise only on expiration date), and Bermuda 
(exercise at specified dates prior to expiration) options). 
 162. Other layers of complexity can be added.  For example, when the law directly 
grants an entitlement, whether the holder has a put option (the option to alienate) 
will vary depending upon the transaction structure governing the entitlement. 
 163. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW:   THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS, 
(Univ. of Chicago Press 2006); Oren Bar-Gill, Pricing Legal Options:   A Behavioral 
Perspective, (working paper, 2005), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi?article=1019&context=nyu/lewp (last visited Mar. 1, 2006) (applying the 
economic ‘pricing option’ concept to legal issues). 
 164. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI § 1 (making eighteen the age of majority for 
voting purposes). 
 165. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (2000) (implementing the Fifteenth 
Amendment and stating that  
 [w]hen used in the subsection, the word “vote” includes all action necessary to 
make a vote effective including, but not limited to, registration or other action 
required by State law prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot, and having such 
ballot counted and included in the appropriate totals of votes cast with respect to 
candidates for public office and propositions for which votes are received in an 
election 
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When policymakers choose options over direct grants of 
entitlements, the option price performs a filtering function.  As the 
costs of exercising the option increase, the percentage of actual 
entitlement holders will decrease.  With the option to vote, Jim Crow 
laws in the South were designed to increase the cost of exercising the 
option,166 while the “motor voter” law was designed to bring the 
option cost down significantly.167  Option prices also reveal 
information about the value of the entitlement.  One goal of 
entitlement design can be to force private actors to reveal their 
private valuations of options regulated by legal rules.168 
In patent and copyright law, call options serve two important 
economic functions:   (1) limiting the number of entitlement 
holders, and thereby reducing social costs by tailoring the number of 
entitlements granted, and (2) producing coarse-grained information 
about the private valuation of the entitlement.  Of course, the 
substantial cost of litigation also functions as a real option that 
reduces uniformity cost.  The focus of analysis here, however, is use of 
options in entitlement design to reduce uniformity cost. 
Relatively recent changes in copyright law have greatly diminished 
the filtering function that real options once played in the form of 
renewal terms and formalities.  In intellectual property law, real 
options promote social welfare when the benefits of sorting 
innovations and nourishing the public domain outweigh the costs of 
forcing entitlement bearers to calculate an option value with respect 
to their innovations and expend resources to purchase the option in 
order to enjoy protection.169 
1. Patent 
Patent law deploys call options along both the subject matter and 
duration dimensions.  With respect to subject matter, not every 
                                                 
). 
 166. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(C) (limiting the use of literacy tests as 
prerequisites for voting in response to abuse of such practices to achieve racially 
discriminatory objectives). 
 167. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(1) (stating that the purpose of motor-voter 
registration is “to establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible 
citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office”). 
 168. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1402 
(2005) (exploring a mechanism for structuring legal entitlements so as to induce 
people to reveal their valuations truthfully by requiring entitlement holders to craft 
options to which others can respond). 
 169. See Long, Information Costs, supra note 64, at 496 (commenting that 
information disclosure rules can increase the overall social welfare but only are 
“efficient so long as they lower net costs to observers by more than they raise net 
costs to owners”). 
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inventor of a new, useful, and non-obvious process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter receives a patent because a 
potential patentee must undergo a time-consuming and expensive 
process to prosecute his or her claim to a patent.170  The potential 
patentee must assess the option value or strike price of patent 
protection and compare that to the costs of exercising the option 
through patent prosecution.171  The option value of patent protection 
in a given case usually is comparative because the potential patentee 
generally also has the options to keep trade secret protection or 
acquire the benefits of defensive publication.172  When a potential 
patentee forgoes protection, society is spared the associated social 
costs.173  As one might expect, real options reduce Type I uniformity 
costs by weeding out low-value inventions across all industries.174  
Empirical research indicates that real options also reduce Type II 
uniformity costs because the value placed on patent protection 
generally varies by industry.175 
Call options along the duration dimension also play an important, 
and often overlooked, role in reducing uniformity cost.176  The 
                                                 
 170. A benchmark for the out-of-pocket expenses of patent prosecution is 
$20,000, although costs will vary with complexity.  See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Patent 
Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 639 n.44 (2002) [hereinafter Long, Patent Signals] 
(listing several differing sources that estimate the range of production costs and 
noting that $20,000 is a conservative estimate). 
 171. Cf. F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, 
And The Complex Mathematics Of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1180 (2003) 
(adapting pricing methodology for stock options to pricing options to license a 
patent). 
 172. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Promise And Perils Of Strategic Publication To 
Create Prior Art:   A Response To Professor Parchomovsky, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2358, 2369 
(2000) (identifying when defensive publication is attractive in a patent race context); 
see also Prior Art Database, www.ip.com/pad/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (providing a 
searchable online database for the defensive publication of technical disclosure 
documents and the creation of prior art). 
 173. It will not always be the case that society gains a net benefit when a potential 
patentee fails to exercise the option.  If the patentee chooses to keep the invention 
secret, society loses the benefits of disclosure, which may outweigh the social costs 
associated with any potential market power the patent may confer. 
 174. See Long, Patent Signals, supra note 170, at 626-27 & n.2 (noting that “when 
the value of intellectual property rights is framed purely in terms of exclusivity and 
rents, worthless patents abound”). 
 175. See, e.g., Cohen et al., Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent, supra note 33, at 9-
11 (showing industry-specific variation in value assigned to patent protection); 
Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and 
Development, in 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 794-97 (1987) 
(demonstrating that the role of patents as means for appropriating returns from 
research and development investments varies among industries). 
 176. See, e.g., Lunney, Quiet Revolution, supra note 6, at 51-52 (remarking that 
although maintenance fees would “not strictly limit the duration of protection to that 
necessary to ensure a given innovation . . ., at the very least, it ensures that protection 
will end once the expected rents from an additional term of protection . . . exceed 
the costs of applying for the extension”); Frank Partnoy, Finance and Patent Length 37 
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formally uniform twenty-year term of patent protection is, in 
substance, quite heterogeneous.  By conditioning protection on 
payment of maintenance fees, the Patent Act forces the patent owner 
periodically to place an option value on continued protection and to 
reveal something about that valuation.  A patent owner’s decision not 
to pay the relatively modest maintenance fees is a decision to 
dedicate the invention to the public domain.177  One study shows that 
the owners of more than half of all patents choose to dedicate their 
inventions to the public domain prior to the expiration of the full 
twenty-year term.178  Data for fee payments during the ten-year period 
from 1994 to 2003 show that, on average, eighteen percent of patent 
owners placed little value on their patents and permitted protection 
to lapse at the 3.5 year mark; forty-two percent of patent owners who 
had proceeded past the first stage chose not to extend protection at 
the 7.5 year mark; and of those patentees who previously had 
purchased extended protection, fully sixty-four percent chose to end 
the patent term at the 11.5 year mark.179  As these data demonstrate, 
patent law’s maintenance-fee provision serves to render a uniformly-
defined dimension of patent rights more context-sensitive.  In a 
sense, patent owners self-tailor the duration of protection. 
By viewing these rules as filters, the uniformity-cost perspective 
reframes at least two debates that have engaged economically-
oriented scholars.  First, the “patent quality” debate can be recast as a 
debate about setting the right price for the option of patent 
protection.  Most commentators appear to agree that some real 
option should be placed along the subject matter dimension.180  
There also seems to be consensus that the option price should be 
relatively high, by requiring prosecution and examination rather than 
                                                 
(U. San Diego Sch. of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 19, 2001), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=285144 (recognizing maintenance fees as a 
form of real option). 
 177. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 
1525-26 (2006) (discussing the reasons patent owners may have for allowing their 
patents to expire by not paying maintenance fees). 
 178. See id. at 8 (claiming that 53.71% of all patentees permit protection to lapse 
for failure to pay maintenance fees); see also Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Optimality of 
the Patent Renewal System, 30 RAND J. OF ECON. 181, 182 (1999) (citing economic 
research showing that “[a] regularity across technology classes and countries is that 
no more than 50% of patents are maintained more than ten years” and that “there is 
considerable variance in renewal rates if patents are categorized by technology and 
nationality of owner”) (citations omitted). 
 179. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, supra note 15, at 
15 (listing the percentage of patents renewed at 3.5 years, 7.5 years, and 11.5 years 
per year between 1994 and 2003, and noting that the renewal data alone cannot be 
used to calculate the average value of patents). 
 180. See, e.g., infra notes 181-182. 
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mere registration.181  Most scholarly debate has focused on whether 
the mesh of the current examination filter should be made smaller to 
restrict the flow of invalid patents into the system.182  Alternatively, the 
examination option could be tiered to force greater revelation of an 
inventor’s private valuation of the invention.183  In general, improving 
quality control in the PTO would tend to increase the option value 
necessary to make pursuing patent protection cost-justified.184 
Second, the extensive economic literature on optimal patent 
duration generally overlooks the role of real options either by 
assuming a uniform term or contemplating variability without analysis 
of how it might be implemented.  Some analysts seek to make the 
case for the efficiency of a uniform term, not recognizing that real 
options render actual terms heterogeneous.185  The bulk of the 
literature, however, demonstrates theoretically that uniform duration 
                                                 
 181. See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State:   Rethinking the Patent 
Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1344 (2004) (analyzing 
trade-offs between registration and prosecution); see also John H. Duffy, Harmony and 
Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 713-15 (2002) (providing a 
brief historical summary of comparative experiences with examination and 
registration systems).  See generally F. Scott Kieff, The Case For Registering Patents and the 
Law and Economics Of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 70-71 (2003) 
(using a hypothetical registration system to illustrate social benefits of prosecution 
system). 
 182. See generally Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search Of 
Optimal Ignorance In The Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219, 1226 (2004) (arguing 
that a closer review of more precise applications would improve the quality of 
patents); Kieff, supra note 181, at 123 (concluding that increased scrutiny of patent 
applications would effect the present system negatively); Symposium, 19 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1 (2004) (responding to Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent 
Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001), with most authors arguing for greater 
investments in patent quality); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why ‘Bad’ Patents 
Survive in the Market and How Should We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents 
9 (Ill. Law & Econ. Working Papers Series, Working Paper No. LE05-004, 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=688005 (supporting the use of administrative 
patent oppositions to improve the quality of patents). 
 183. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Douglas Lichtman & Bhaven N. Sampat, What To 
Do About Bad Patents, 28 REGULATION 10, 12 (2005) (suggesting that a strong 
presumption of validity for an issued patent could be turned into an option that 
inventors could purchase by paying for a thoroughgoing examination). 
 184. The portfolio strategy suggests that the option value has to be calculated not 
only in reference to potential revenues from the exploitation of individual inventions 
but also from revenues associated with the marginal increase in portfolio value.  See 
generally Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, supra note 15, at 5-
6 (“The true value of patents inheres not in their individual worth, but in their 
aggregation into a collection of related patents—a patent portfolio.”).  Portfolio 
value likely varies by industry, particularly because some individual pharmaceutical 
patents carry significant value.  See generally John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 
GEO. L.J. 435, 437-39 (2004) (reporting the results of an empirical study of litigated 
patents). 
 185. See, e.g., D.G. McFetridge & M. Rafiquzzaman, The Scope and Duration of the 
Patent Right and the Nature of Research Rivalry, 8 RESEARCH IN L. & ECON. 91, 117 (1986) 
(“A good case can be made for the existing patent term if one is willing to assume 
that the ability to invent is not widely distributed.”). 
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for all patents is inefficient because optimal patent life is 
conditional.186  Some analysts recognize what I have named Type II 
uniformity costs and have suggested that patent terms should be 
tailored to vary by industry.187  Other analysts tend to assume a one-to-
one relation between patents and products and assert that patent life 
optimally would be tailored for each product.188  These analyses 
generally overlook a deep conceptual tension in analyzing the 
conditions for perfectly-tailored protection. Patents are second-best 
solutions to appropriability problems.189  If policymakers had 
sufficient information about the value of individual inventions to 
tailor duration for each invention, some form of direct compensation 
                                                 
 186. In the foundational work for this enterprise, Professor Nordhaus’s model 
acknowledges that “the optimal life is extremely sensitive to changes in the 
parameters of the system,” but he then accepts that actual life is a uniform term.  
WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE:   A THEORETICAL 
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 81 (1969).  In 1969, U.S. patent law did not 
impose maintenance fees, so his assumption of a uniform term is more 
understandable than for post-1982 analyses. 
 187. See, e.g., M.H.I. Dore, J. Kushner & I. Masse, The Optimal Length of a Patent with 
Variable Output Elasticity and Returns to Scale in R&D, 21 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 10, 11, 19, 
23 (1993) (explicitly recognizing uniformity cost, modeling patent duration on per-
invention according to demand, and output elasticities, which correspond to 
industry maturity); Nancy T. Gallini, Patent Policy and Costly Imitation, 23 RAND J. OF 
ECON. 52, 62-63 (1992) (suggesting that “a narrow patent may accelerate innovation 
by allowing future generations of the innovation to be developed”); F.M. Scherer, 
Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life:   A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 
422, 426-27 (1972) (recognizing the uniformity cost of single patent duration 
whenever other barriers to imitation permit sufficient innovator appropriation and 
suggesting compulsory licensing as a form of tailoring); Michael Waterson, The 
Economics of Product Patents, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 860, 869 (1990) (noting the difficulty 
of making patent law industry specific); Donald J. Wright, Optimal Patent Breadth and 
Length with Costly Imitation, 17 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 419, 432 (1999) (arguing that 
product specific patents are optimal but recognizing that they require likely 
unavailable information on market structure, demand conditions, and imitation cost 
structures). 
 188. See, e.g., Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and 
the Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. ECON. 1, 19 (1980) (modeling variable effects of patent 
life); Lawrence M. DeBrock, Market Structure, Innovation, and Optimal Patent Life, 28 
J.L. & ECON. 223, 233-34 (1985) (illustrating how “the government can vary patent-
life policy to maximize the constrained social welfare”); Vincenzo Denicolò, Patent 
Races and Optimal Patent Breadth and Length, 44 J. OF INDUS. ECON. 249, 263 (1996) 
(demonstrating that “the patent breadth-length optimal mix depends in a subtle 
way . . . on the relationship between social welfare and post-innovation products . . . 
and the breadth of the patent”); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent 
Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. OF ECON. 106, 111-12 (1990) (concluding that “optimal 
policy calls for infinitely-lived patents whenever patent breadth is increasingly costly 
in terms of deadweight loss”); Manfredi La Manna, Ross Macleod, & David de Meza, 
The Case for Permissive Patents, 33 EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 1427, 1430 (1989) (modeling 
variable patent life in a permissive patent system). 
 189. Cf. DeBrock, supra note 188, at 226 (“However, it should be clear that such a 
first-best situation is not relevant in a world where policymakers are forced to use an 
inherently second-best tool:   patent protection.”). 
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likely would be a more efficient way to finance innovation than a 
patent.190 
Because policymakers will never have perfect information but may 
be in a position to acquire sufficient information to tailor along 
industry-specific or technology-specific lines, tailoring may be 
preferable for addressing Type II uniformity costs.  As the discussion 
in Part II demonstrates, however, tailoring patent duration would be 
very difficult.191  Real options address at least some Type II uniformity 
costs and can be quite effective in reducing Type I costs.  The 
uniformity-cost perspective suggests that future research on the 
patent system should analyze option pricing rather than either 
assuming a uniform term or modeling per-invention variability.192 
2. Copyright 
In copyright law, the uniformity-cost perspective reveals how recent 
changes that eliminate or constrict real options have increased the 
social costs of copyright law.  Traditionally, U.S. copyright law tracked 
patent law by deploying real options along the subject matter and 
duration dimensions.  Prior to enactment of the Copyright Act of 
1976, authors arguably received direct common law entitlements to 
prohibit unauthorized publication.193  If and when the author chose 
                                                 
 190. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection:   A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 1813, 1844 (1984) (acknowledging that as patent policy becomes more case-
specific, the justification for patent over direct reward weakens). 
 191. See supra Parts II.B, C (analyzing provisions requiring formally uniform patent 
duration); see also M.K. Berkowitz & Y. Kotowitz, Patent Policy in an Open Economy, 15 
CANADIAN J. ECON. 1, 12 (1982) (recognizing that “[i]ndustrial structure of invention 
may be different in different industries, calling for drastically different patent 
policies” but concluding that because patent policy has traditionally been uniform, 
scope and duration must reflect conditions for the majority of industries); John F. 
Duffy, A Minimum Optimal Patent Term 9 (Working Paper, 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=354282 (arguing that even if it’s theoretically efficient to 
vary patent duration by sector, administrative costs and risks of wasteful rent-seeking 
make tailored duration unattractive). 
 192. Suzanne Scotchmer is the leading thinker along these lines. See generally 
Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Optimality of the Patent Renewal System, 30 RAND J. OF ECON. 
181 (1999) (modeling option prices under certain conditions); see also Moore, supra 
note 177, at 1551-52 (advocating study of option design, such as annual maintenance 
fees, to account for industry variation and to improve social welfare); Partnoy, supra 
note 176, at 34-37 (suggesting varying option prices as a means of regulating effective 
patent duration); cf. Ted O’Donoghue, Suzanne Scotchmer & Jacques-François 
Thisse, Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress, 7 J. ECON. & 
MGMT. STRATEGY 1, 24-25 (1998) (modeling a patent’s “effective” life based on patent 
breadth’s effects on demand for invention); Helen Weeds, Strategic Delay in a Real 
Options Model of R&D Competition, 69 REV. ECON. STUD. 729 (2001) (applying option 
theory to model investment decisions in research and development).  The concept of 
effective life could be extended to include patent owner’s response to real options as 
well. 
 193. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(describing “common law copyright” as more limited to right of first publication); 
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to publish the work, however, any common law protection was 
extinguished and federal protection was conditioned on exercise of 
the option—complying with the notice, registration, and deposit 
requirements.194  An author who chose to publish without complying 
with these so-called “formalities” effectively chose to dedicate the 
work to the public domain, thereby eliminating the social costs of 
copyright with respect to that work.195 
The exercise price for copyright protection was considerably lower 
than for patent protection because registration fees were cheaper 
than patent filing fees and copyright registration involved no 
examination initially and only very cursory examination 
subsequently.196  Even with the lower strike price, during the early 
years of copyright in the late eighteenth century, very few copyright 
owners valued the option of protection sufficiently to exercise their 
options.197  Even well into the most recent years in which registration 
was required for published works, the total number of registrations 
was less than 600,000.198  Policymakers reduced the effectiveness of 
the filtering function that the registration-and-notice requirements 
played when the United States chose to adhere to the Berne 
Convention, which requires that member states grant the entitlement 
itself rather than an option to acquire the entitlement.199 
                                                 
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information As Speech, Information As Goods:   Some 
Thoughts On Marketplaces And The Bill Of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 694 & 
n.205 (1992) (discussing possible common law copyright in unpublished works). 
 194. In the 1909 Act, Congress slightly relaxed these by requiring notice only to 
secure protection and requiring registration and deposit as prerequisites for a 
copyright infringement action.  See Washingtonian Publ’g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 
30, 36-39 (1939) (reviewing legislative history and rejecting the claim that post-
publication infringements occurring prior to registration and deposit are immune 
from suit). 
 195. See, e.g., Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 297 F. Supp. 107, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 
1967) (concluding that a government statue exhibited without visible notice of 
copyright or any restrictions regarding copying constituted a divestive publication), 
aff’d on other grounds, 417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1969). 
 196. See LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 12, at 235 (stating 
that registration fees climbed from $10 to $20 in 1991, to $30 in 2000, while the 
renewal fee increased from $12 in 1991 to $45 in 2000). 
 197. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 33 (1994) 
[hereinafter PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW] (reporting that 15,000 titles were published in 
the United States between 1790 to 1800 and evidence of only 779 copyright 
registrations has been found). 
 198. See LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 12, at 236 
(illustrating in graph form the number of registrations between 1910 and 2000, and 
indicating that the number of registrations in 1989 was less than 600,000); Annual 
Report of the Register of Copyrights (2002), http://www.copyright.gov/reports/ann 
ual/2002/registrations.html (showing that total pre-1989 registrations peaked at 
581,276 in 1987). 
 199. See supra Part II.C (analyzing the Berne Convention and the TRIPS 
Agreement); see also Kahle v. Ashcroft, No. 04-1127, 2004 WL 2663157 (N.D. Cal. 
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Current law, however, has not entirely abandoned real options.  
Instead, authors of works in the United States receive both a call 
option and a put option200 along the subject matter dimension.  
Although the copyright entitlement is granted automatically as soon 
as an original work of authorship is fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression, the entitlement is not fully functional.  The entitlement 
can be assigned or licensed, and alleged infringers can be threatened 
by cease-and-desist letters.201  Authors of works in the United States or 
their assigns, however, must still exercise a call option, which requires 
registration with the Copyright Office and is subject to minimal 
examination, to enforce the entitlement in federal court.202 
The Section 411 call option203 still performs a filtering function, but 
it is much less effective at reducing uniformity cost than pre-1989 law.  
Under prior law, the registration-and-notice filter reduced uniformity 
costs because a user coming upon a published, unregistered work or 
a published work without a copyright notice was free to make his or 
her desired use of the information.  Under current law, a potential 
user must now assume that a work of authorship, even one published 
without notice, is protected and cannot be used without a license 
(unless the desired use is a privileged use under the law), even if the 
author has no intention of enforcing rights or would encourage the 
desired use. 
In order to regain some of the former benefits provided by the real 
option on copyrightable subject matter, efforts are underway to make 
public licensing or public dedication less expensive and easier to 
employ for authors interested in exercising the put option that 
current law now grants.204  Although these efforts reduce uniformity 
                                                 
2004) (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that the removal of traditional real options 
violates Clause 8 and the First Amendment) (appeal filed). 
 200. The option to alienate the copyright entitlement is clouded.  Although sale 
and licensing are readily done, dedication of the entitlement to the public domain is 
slightly less certain because of the inalienable termination-of-transfers provisions.  See 
17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000) (allowing for the transfer of ownership of a copyright in 
whole or in part); 17 U.S.C. § 203 (specifying the conditions under which copyright 
transfer will be terminated and the effects of that termination). 
 201. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (allowing for the transfer of ownership of a copyright 
in whole or in part); 17 U.S.C. § 501 (permitting copyright owners to institute actions 
against copyright infringers). 
 202. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (mandating that copyright claims be properly registered 
before any copyright infringement actions are instituted); William F. Patry, Does 
Copyright Registration Matter?, The Patry Copyright Blog, 
http://williampatry.blogspot.com/ (June 7, 2005, 07:34 EST) (emphasizing that 
proper registration is a prerequisite for an infringement action and that failure to do 
so will result in dismissal). 
 203. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (applying a registration requirement in copyright law). 
 204. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 183, 184, 186, 197 (2004) (describing contractual responses to imbalanced 
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cost by promoting reallocation of entitlements, transaction costs for 
doing so remain positive.  On balance, U.S. adherence to the Berne 
Convention has exacerbated uniformity cost along the subject matter 
dimension. 
Matters are worse with respect to copyright duration.  Until 1976, 
copyright law divided duration into two terms, which served to vary 
the effective term of protection because the renewal procedure acted 
as a real option similar to patent law’s maintenance fees.205  The 
Copyright Act of 1976 removed this filter by adopting a life-plus-fifty 
term, recently extended to life-plus-seventy.206  This change has 
rendered the duration dimension of copyright law particularly 
insensitive to context, as was made dramatically evident by the 
submissions to the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft.207  Implicitly 
recognizing the problem of uniformity cost, the Copyright Office 
recently launched a proposal to broaden the rights of libraries and 
archives with respect to “orphan works.”208  Although this effort is 
welcome, it does not materially alter the substantial social costs 
imposed by removing the real option of renewable terms.209 
The increase in social costs imposed by a substantively uniform 
term of copyright protection has led even leading law-and-economics 
scholars William Landes and Richard Posner, who once praised the 
life-plus-fifty term as economically efficient,210 to call for 
reestablishing a real option along copyright law’s duration 
dimension.211  Some policymakers have made modest proposals along 
                                                 
public law). 
 205. See supra notes 176-179 and accompanying text (discussing option value and 
the effect of maintenance fees on patent duration); LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE, supra note 12, at 235-49 (analyzing copyright renewal data to show the 
strong filtering effect of renewal term and the weaker, but significant, effect of 
modest changes in registration and renewal fees). 
 206. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000) (requiring that copyrights created on or after 
Jan. 1, 1978, endure for seventy years after the author’s death).  Until the passage of 
the Copyright Act of 1976, the term of copyright was divided into two renewable 
terms.  See Ochoa, supra note 159, at 22-23, 42-43 (noting that the 1976 Act was 
generally accepted as part of copyright reform codifying principles under the 1909 
Act and requirements of the Berne Convention). 
 207. See generally Submission of Amici in support of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft 
Legal Documents:   Supreme Court, http://eldred.cc/legal/supremecourt.html (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2006) (arguing that the Copyright Clause limits the means by which 
Congress can achieve its statutory purpose).  
 208. See U.S. Copyright Office, Notice of Inquiry, Orphan Works, 70 Fed. Reg. 
3739 (Jan. 26, 2005) (seeking comment on recommended solutions for works whose 
copyright owner(s) cannot be identified or located). 
 209. See, e.g., Editorial, Rip. Mix. Burn., THE ECONOMIST, July 2, 2005 (urging 
Congress to enact fourteen-year renewable copyright terms). 
 210. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 362-63 (1989). 
 211. See LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 12, at 244 (noting 
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these lines.212  The uniformity-cost perspective underscores why such 
measures are needed. 
3. Scope options 
The full range of real options as a policy tool to reduce uniformity 
cost has not been explored in the literature.  Although some 
commentators have wrestled with the merits of registration versus 
examination procedures along the subject matter dimension and 
others have discussed the relative merits of renewable terms or 
maintenance fees along the duration dimension, few have discussed 
how the benefits of real options could be realized along the scope 
dimension of copyright or patent entitlements. 
Consider the scope of copyright law, for example.  Copyright 
prohibits four kinds of copying:   (1) complete duplication, 
(2) partial duplication, (3) creation of a work substantially similar to 
the whole, and (4) creation of a work with a substantially similar 
part.213  At a minimum, a copyright owner should receive the right to 
prohibit complete duplication if copyright is to serve as any kind of 
solution to the appropriability problem.  Copyright law historically 
was restricted in scope to this kind of copying and gradually has 
expanded to grant the owner the entitlement to control these other 
forms of copying as well.  It would be possible to impose a call option 
filter by conditioning the grant of the right to control the other three 
kinds of copying on either payment of a modest fee and/or 
registration of the claim to control these uses. 
Take, for example, the scope of copyright in a novel.  If a real 
option were in place, the author would receive the exclusive right to 
complete duplication at the time copyright vests.  If the author also 
would like to have the rights to prepare derivative works from the 
novel, such as motion pictures or theatrical adaptations, the author 
would have to pay a small fee and register the claim with the 
Copyright Office.  There already is a well-established market for 
                                                 
that “[c]urrent copyright law does not differentiate among different types of work” 
and arguing that “[a] system of indefinite renewals would automatically distinguish 
the enduring from the ephemeral”); see also id. at 249 (“[A] system of indefinite 
renewals . . . will separate valuable works in which continued copyright protection 
may be socially efficient from works in which the cost of continuing that protection 
exceeds the sum of administrative and access . . . costs.”). 
 212. See Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R. 2408, 109th Cong. (May 17, 2005) 
(proposing an amendment to Title 17 of the U.S. Code to allow abandoned 
copyrighted works to enter the public domain after fifty years). 
 213. See 4-13 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03 (discussing what constitutes copying 
and defining the concept of substantial similarity). 
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“movie rights,” that is, the option to adapt a novel for use in a film.214  
Adding a real option into the scope dimension simply would give the 
public a right to participate in this market as well.  Novelists who 
placed little or no value on the adaptation option effectively would 
dedicate that right to the public domain, potentially making 
filmmaking a marginally less expensive enterprise.  Similarly, with 
musical works and sound recordings, one could imagine a real option 
to control the right to make partial duplication in the form of digital 
samples.  Recent evidence indicates that some copyright owners 
would not purchase the partial duplication option.215 
Even though scope options potentially would reduce uniformity 
costs, the administrative costs of implementation could be quite 
significant.216  The point here is not to advocate for adoption of real 
options for the scope of intellectual property rights, but instead to 
demonstrate that the option-value conception captures much of the 
debate about subject matter and duration and that this concept could 
be extended to scope as well. 
B. Standards in Intellectual Property Entitlements 
One reason that real options may not be used along the scope 
dimension of patent and copyright law is that both bodies of law 
reduce uniformity costs by adopting standards rather than rules to 
define the scope and subject matter dimensions.217  This flexibility can 
                                                 
 214. See Douglas Y’Barbo, Aesthetic Ambition Versus Commercial Appeal:   Adapting 
Novels to Film and the Copyright Law, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 299, 310-12 (1998) 
(describing the appeal of adapting novels for use in film in the movie industry and 
the lucrative market for movie rights). 
 215. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, The Struggle for Music Copyright, 57 FLA. L. REV. 
907, 961 (2005) (describing a Wired magazine compilation CD comprised of tracks 
from famous artists all released under a Creative Commons sampling license).  
Switching the default from automatic protection with the option of open licensing to 
open resource with the option of closing it off would increase the pool of resources 
from which samples could be drawn. 
 216. See Duffy, supra note 191, at 14 (noting that the administrative costs of 
tailored duration make it unattractive). 
 217. The rules/standards literature is substantial.  See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE 
TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 3, 15-63 (1987) (highlighting “the contradiction between 
a commitment to mechanically applicable rules as the appropriate form for resolving 
disputes . . . and a commitment to situation-sensitive, ad-hoc standards”); FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES:  A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED 
DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 104 (1991) (arguing that “it is a mistake to 
equate the dimension of ruleness with the dimension of specificity”); Louis Kaplow, 
Rules Versus Standards:   An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992) (arguing 
that the only difference between rules and standards “is the extent to which efforts to 
give content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act”); Duncan 
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-
1713 (1976) (assessing the formal concept of rules as legal form and distinguishing 
rules from standards); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. 
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serve to reduce uniformity costs by adapting the availability and scope 
of protection to the appropriability conditions that prevail in specific 
contexts.  By contrast, both patent and copyright law use rules to 
specify duration and rely on real options, in the case of patent law, to 
reduce uniformity costs. 
Legal standards confer interpretive discretion on adjudicators and, 
generally, the more broadly a standard is stated, the more discretion 
adjudicators have.218  This interpretive discretion can be deployed ad 
hoc or systematically.  With respect to the scope of intellectual 
property rights, courts can choose to use flexible doctrines to strike 
the incentives-access balance either on a per-work or per-invention 
basis, or more broadly along industry-specific or technology-specific 
lines.  For purposes of this discussion, this subsection addresses only 
the ways in which intellectual property scope and subject matter 
doctrines reduce uniformity costs by requiring ad hoc balancing. 
The effectiveness of judicial interpretation as a means of rendering 
uniform intellectual property rights more context-sensitive depends 
on the dimension of rights being adapted.  With regard to subject 
matter, courts have a certain amount of discretion to determine 
whether a work is sufficiently original219 or to draw the line between 
                                                 
& PUB. POL’Y 101, 116-17 (1997) (concluding that rules promote autonomy and 
individual values, whereas standards encourage conformity to state goals); Margaret 
Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 783-90 (1989) 
(analyzing rules as either instrumental or substantive); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and 
Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592-93 (1988) (refusing to accept that 
there is a choice between standards and rules and arguing that “we seem to be stuck 
with both” or “oscillate between them”); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA 
L. REV. 379, 379-430 (1985) (discussing the relationship between rules and standards 
and concluding that “much of legal argumentation is simply an exercise in the 
formalistic mechanisms of a dialectic which doesn’t go anywhere”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 958 (1995) (arguing that “the disadvantages 
of rules . . . are often insufficiently appreciated, and that legal systems sometimes do 
and should abandon rules in favor of a form of casuistry”). 
 218. For present purposes, the following definitions make the point: 
(a) Rules.—A legal directive is “rule”-like when it binds a decisionmaker to 
respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts. 
. . . . 
(b) Standards.—A legal directive is “standard”-like when it tends to collapse 
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle 
or policy to a fact situation. 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
22, 58 (1992).  It is critical that “the decisionmaker” be understood to include the 
enforcer as well as the adjudicator.  A speed limit would appear to be a paradigmatic 
rule, but it becomes a standard in the hands of an enforcer who relies on a set of 
contextual factors when deciding how to enforce the provision. 
 219. See Trotter Hardy, The Copyrightability of New Works of Authorship:   “XML 
Schemas” as an Example, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 855, 858-61 (2001) (outlining several 
methods that courts have used to determine whether a work is sufficiently original to 
be copyrighted, including the use of dictionaries to compare emerging technologies 
to the text the Copyright Act, the analysis of whether an idea for a work merges with 
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unprotected idea and protected expression.  Similarly, determining 
whether a process is protectible220 or whether a biological organism is 
a “machine,” a “manufacture,” or “composition of matter,”221 requires 
the exercise of interpretive discretion through which the courts can 
tailor protection.  As with subject matter, the scope doctrines under 
both patent and copyright law delegate to courts substantial 
discretion that can be exercised to tailor the balance of incentives 
and access for specific types of information.  With regard to duration, 
however, the courts have little discretion to tailor the term of 
protection directly.  Nonetheless, some commentators have shown 
that courts can use their discretion over scope to limit or enhance the 
effective duration of protection.222  When courts disagree with a 
legislative judgment to tailor protection, judicial interpretation also 
can be used to make intellectual property rights more uniform by 
subverting legislative tailoring.223 
1. Patent 
Patent law deploys standards rather than rules along the subject 
matter and scope dimensions.224  Although helpful, use of standards 
                                                 
the expression of that work, or the consideration of competing social policies 
underlying the copyrightability of the work). 
 220. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 
1375, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1599 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding methods of doing 
business to be patentable “processes”). 
 221. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980) (holding human-
made bacteria not naturally occurring to be patentable subject matter). 
 222. See Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 776-77 (2003) 
(arguing that courts should examine the market for a copyrighted work over a 
period of time in order to determine whether future uses of that work are infringing 
or non-infringing); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time:   A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
409, 411 (2002) (voicing that courts should not assume that the scope of protection 
afforded during copyright terms is “constant or unaffected” by the passage of time 
and that courts should consider the passage of time when setting the duration of 
copyright terms). 
 223. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250-51 
(1903) (construing the definition of copyrightable subject matter containing “the 
words ‘engraving,’ ‘cut’ and ‘print’ applicable only to pictorial illustrations or works 
connected with the fine arts” and rendering nugatory the fine arts limitation on 
grounds that “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the 
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations”); cf. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of 
overriding congressional intent to tailor patent rights in inventions comprising living 
organisms); J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc., 534 U.S. 124 
(2001) (citing Chakrabarty as controlling precedent in holding that tailored 
protection for plant varieties is not exclusive of the general utility patent protection 
for the same subject matter). 
 224. See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 4, at 1642-58 (identifying nine 
such patent law standards as “policy levers”:   (1) abstract ideas, (2) utility, 
(3) experimental use, (4) skill in the art, (5) secondary considerations, (6) written 
description, (7) doctrine of equivalents, (8) pioneering patents, (9) reverse doctrine 
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along the subject matter dimension permits only coarse-grained 
exercise of interpretive discretion because an adjudicator can choose 
only between applying all or no rights to a particular innovation or 
class of innovations.  The standards that govern patent scope, by 
contrast, supply a wider range of responses to uniformity cost. 
a. Subject matter 
The formally uniform statutory definition of patentable subject 
matter is broadly stated and therefore confers a considerable degree 
of interpretive discretion on the federal courts and the PTO.  The 
courts have resisted using discretion to sustain categorical exclusions 
from patentable subject matter, finding this to be too crude a filter.  
As a result, in the name of uniformity, the courts have extended 
patent protection to living organisms,225 methods of doing business,226 
and software.227  Nonetheless, courts retain discretion to reduce 
uniformity cost on a per-patent basis through flexible subject matter 
doctrines including the limitation on patenting “abstract ideas,”228 the 
utility doctrine,229 novelty’s requirement of a prior “public” use,230 and 
the non-obviousness standard.231  Application of other eligibility 
doctrines, such as the disclosure requirements of enablement,232 best 
                                                 
of equivalents). 
 225. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308-09 (announcing that patentable subject 
matter included human-made bacteria not naturally occurring in nature). 
 226. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 
1375, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1599 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting the argument that 
methods of doing business were not “processes” able to be patented). 
 227. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1447, 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (observing that “since the manipulation of 
numbers is a fundamental part of computer technology,” courts had to reassess 
traditional patent law barring the patenting of mathematical algorithms in order to 
determine what rights would be afforded to emerging software). 
 228. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853) (giving birth to the 
doctrine that abstract ideas are not patentable). 
 229. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (conferring protection upon “new and useful” 
inventions).  Although broadly construed, utility still places a meaningful limit on 
patentability, particularly with respect to biotechnology and upstream research tools.  
See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 4, at 1644-45 (discussing utility with 
respect to inventions in the life sciences, particularly the requirement of proof of 
therapeutic effect for pharmaceutical patents). 
 230. See, e.g., Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371, 
1381, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1901, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that the novelty 
requirement of a public use takes into account “the nature of the activity that 
occurred in public; the public access to and knowledge of the public use; and 
whether there was any confidentiality obligation imposed upon persons who 
observed the use”) (quotation omitted). 
 231. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (stating that an invention may not be patented when “the 
differences between the [invention] and [a previously patented invention] are such 
that . . . [they] would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said [invention] pertains”). 
 232. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring inventors to compose a detailed description of 
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mode,233 and written description,234 as well as the triggers for statutory 
bars,235 all supply tools for the courts to assess and reduce uniformity 
cost.  For example, non-obviousness and the disclosure doctrines vary 
to a certain degree along technology-specific or industry-specific lines 
because these are applied with reference to a “person having 
ordinary skill in the art.”236 
When specifying eligibility through the PHOSITA device, the law 
requires a court or a patent examiner to make a variety of judgments 
concerning the level of skill in the art and the set of background 
knowledge that the PHOSITA would be able to rely upon when 
drafting or reading a patent.237  As Professors Allison and Tiller have 
noted, “[w]hen one realizes that an ordinarily skilled practitioner 
may range from an experienced mechanic or electrician to a person 
with a Ph.D. and much experience in molecular biology or computer 
science, the conclusion is inescapable that not all rules can be 
applied exactly the same in every case.”238  The courts can and do vary 
patent eligibility for different industries or technologies by the 
amount of information and the kinds of technical skills that a 
patentee can incorporate by reference.239 
Consider, for example, the role of the PHOSITA in three 
doctrines:   non-obviousness, enablement, and written description.  
When contemplating whether the inventor’s solution to a particular 
                                                 
the invention to be patented, including information that would enable other 
inventors to make and use the invention and to “set forth the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention”). 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (denying patents for inventions that were patented, 
described in a printed publication, or on sale within the United States for more than 
one year prior to the date of the patent application). 
 236. See R. Polk Wagner, Comment, Exactly Backwards:   Exceptionalism and the 
Federal Circuit, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 749, 751-52 (2004) (discussing the effects of 
the PHOSITA standard on eligibility and scope, particularly the notion that the 
“easier” the field, the more likely the patent will be rejected for obviousness and the 
“harder” the field, the less likely the patent will be rejected for obviousness). 
 237. See id. at 751 (criticizing the widespread reliance on the PHOSITA standard, 
with its variance amongst “easy” and “hard” fields, as having an indeterminate effect 
on patents); Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 4, at 1650 (acknowledging that 
“[a] great deal of patent doctrine . . . rests upon the measurement of some legal 
parameter against the skill and knowledge of the PHOSITA” and that “in 
many . . . instances, the role of the PHOSITA is a judicial, rather than a statutory, 
creation”). 
 238. John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 1083 n.265 (2003). 
 239. See In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1116, 1120 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who 
is presumed to know the relevant prior art.” (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc. v. 
Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196, 1202 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986))). 
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problem would have been obvious at the time of invention, courts 
and patent examiners must make judgments about the rate and 
direction of innovation in a particular field and about the amount of 
prior art and background knowledge that a PHOSITA could call 
upon.240  Similarly, courts and patent examiners must invoke the 
PHOSITA to determine whether the written description in the patent 
demonstrates that the inventor possessed the invention at the time of 
filing, and whether the patent provides sufficient information to 
enable a PHOSITA to practice the invention without undue 
experimentation.241  The patentee may incorporate by reference a 
wide range of background theoretical and practical knowledge to 
satisfy either inquiry, so long as the goals of the written description 
and enablement requirements are met.242 
From the perspective of entitlement design, the legislative decision 
to define patent eligibility largely through these standards, rather 
than through rules reduces uniformity cost by rendering this 
nominally uniform dimension of patent law more context-sensitive.  
Indeed, the choice of standards over rules reflects a legislative 
expectation that courts will use this interpretive discretion to reduce 
uniformity cost by varying patentable subject matter in response to 
the appropriability conditions surrounding a particular invention or 
class of inventions as circumstances may indicate.  This discretion has 
been, and can be, used to tailor subject matter to manage and reduce 
Type II uniformity costs by differentiating among types of processes 
                                                 
 240. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious To Whom?  Evaluating Inventions from the 
Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885 (2004) (arguing that the Federal 
Circuit only partially incorporates the PHOSITA’s knowledge by excluding his or her 
tacit knowledge); Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 4, at 1593-94 (accusing the 
Federal Circuit of applying a stringent nonobviousness standard to biotechnological 
inventions, while applying a lenient nonobviousness standard to software cases); 
Donald S. Chisum, Anticipation, Enablement and Obviousness:   An Eternal Golden Braid, 
15 AIPLA Q.J. 57, 58 (1987) (reiterating that an invention can be found obvious and 
a patent not awarded to its inventor so long as it was obvious, if not entirely  
anticipated, from a previously patented invention). 
 241. See, e.g., Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. MDS Am., Inc., 413 F.3d 1301, 75 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (providing an example of a court divided 
over whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to show a lack of enablement based 
on level of the PHOSITA’s background knowledge). 
 242. See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 921, 69 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1886, 1892 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (elucidating that while the written 
description and enablement requirements “often [significantly] overlap . . . they are 
nonetheless independent of each other” and “an invention may be described without 
an enabling disclosure of how to make or use it” or “an invention may be enabled 
even though is has not been described”); see also Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & 
Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (denying 
rehearing en banc accompanied by a range of dissenting and concurring opinions 
discussing recent doctrinal developments with respect to enablement and written 
description). 
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in patent law (e.g. business methods) for which no appreciable 
appropriability problem exists.  The subject matter doctrines are less 
well suited for addressing Type I uniformity costs, but these doctrines 
still have an impact. 
b. Scope 
The scope doctrines of patent law provide courts with an even 
wider range of tools to reduce uniformity cost, particularly when 
remedial options are included within the definition of an 
entitlement’s scope.  Commentators have recognized that scope 
doctrines that rely upon the PHOSITA can be used by courts to 
purposefully tailor patent protection along industry-specific or 
technology-specific lines.243  For example, an invention is defined by 
the patent’s claims and these claims are to be interpreted as a matter 
of law in the way a PHOSITA would read them.244  Normally, the 
words in a claim are to be given their ordinary meaning, unless the 
patentee has acted as her own lexicographer.245  In the latter case, 
linguistic conventions within the field of invention could serve to 
expand or narrow the scope of the “invention” to which the exclusive 
rights apply.246 
Consequently, the scope of patent protection can vary depending 
upon how liberally the courts and patent examiners understand the 
amount of background knowledge that can be incorporated.  Patent 
scope also can vary along industry-specific or technology-specific lines 
through application of the doctrine of equivalents, which extends the 
                                                 
 243. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 4, at 1648-51 (analyzing 
tailoring flexibility enabled by PHOSITA doctrines); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. 
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 916 (1990) 
(“Our goal has been to show that scope doctrines can be used to approximate the 
‘tailoring’ function proposed by economists who model optimal patent length, with 
an eye toward retaining incentives for subsequent improvements.”). 
 244. See Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477, 45 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“It is the person of ordinary skill in 
the field of the invention through whose eyes the claims are construed.”); see also 
Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (2000) 
(lauding the PHOSITA as “one of the cynosures of [the] patent system” because he 
“has knowledge of the underlying assumptions present in his technological 
community and is sensitive to facts on the ground”). 
 245. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (emphasizing that courts should look first to to 
intrinsic evidence, namely the words used in the patent claim itself, because such 
evidence is “the most significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed 
claim language”). 
 246. See, e.g., Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems., Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578, 38 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1126, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A technical term used in a patent 
document is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by persons 
experienced in the field of the invention.”). 
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patentees’ rights to products or processes with elements deemed to 
be the “equivalent” of elements in the claims defining the protected 
invention.247  To the extent that the PHOSITA is used to evaluate 
equivalence, application of the doctrine is rendered context-
sensitive.248 
Finally, courts enjoy considerable discretion to fashion relief when 
infringement has been proven, and this discretion should be applied 
to reduce uniformity cost.  Professors Burk and Lemley rightly point 
out that there may be more situations than courts currently recognize 
in which to withhold injunctive relief and the Supreme Court appears 
poised to consider this view.249  The point can be extended to 
monetary relief as well.  Industry-specific information plays an 
essential role in the evidence supporting willfulness of the 
infringement and the amount of any damage award, whether 
calculated as a reasonable royalty or as lost profits. 
2. Copyright 
Copyright law also uses standards along the subject matter and 
scope dimensions to reduce uniformity cost. 
                                                 
 247. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 
(1997) (recasting the doctrine of equivalents as applicable to the individual elements 
of the patent claim and not to the invention in its entirety); see also Cotropia, “After 
Arising”, supra note 6, at 192-201 (arguing that doctrine of equivalents should be 
tailored for rapidly-developing, cumulative technology industries); Julie E. Cohen & 
Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope And Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 
53-55 (2001) (arguing that the doctrine of equivalents should be tailored as applied 
to software patents). 
 248. The courts have announced two different tests for equivalence.  The first test 
is the function-way-result test, which considers “the purpose for which an ingredient 
is used in a patent, the qualities it has when combined with the other ingredients, 
and the function which it is intended to perform.”  Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde 
Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950).  The second test is the reasonable 
interchangeability test, which considers the extent to which the accused and claimed 
elements are known to be interchangeable with each other.  Hilton Davis Chem. Co. 
v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1647 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).  The latter test 
explicitly relies on the PHOSITA; it is less clear whether the former does as well. 
 249. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 733 (2005) (granting 
certiorari to review MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2005), which concerns the proper standard for granting 
permanent injunctive relief against a patent infringer); Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, 
supra note 4, at 1665-68 (citing hold-ups, anticommons situations, and cases in which 
appropriability conditions may favor a subsidized compulsory license as candidates 
for withholding injunctive relief); see also Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to 
Innovation:   Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 857 (2003) (suggesting that appropriability conditions in 
the pharmaceutical industry do not require property rule protection in order to 
maintain incentives for  pharmaceutical developers). 
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a. Subject matter 
With respect to subject matter, copyright law provides courts with 
even greater doctrinal flexibility than does patent law.  Principally, 
these doctrines are the idea/expression dichotomy, the functionality 
exception, and the merger doctrine.  Copyright applies only to the 
author’s original expression and not the abstract ideas embodied in 
the copyrighted work.250  As Learned Hand famously expounded, 
courts seeking to draw the line between idea and expression must 
choose a point along a continuum of abstraction.251  Likewise, facts 
are not copyrightable but an author’s expression in relating facts 
usually will be sufficiently original to be copyrightable.252  Similar line-
drawing difficulties arise and may be resolved differently depending 
on subject matter.  The merger doctrine holds that if there are 
limited means to express ideas or facts, then the expression merges 
with the uncopyrightable element and the whole of the author’s work 
is either uncopyrightable or the copyright in the expression is 
unenforceable.253  The functionality doctrine is related to merger and 
holds that protection for expressive sculptural, pictorial, and graphic 
works that are combined with functional goods is limited only to 
                                                 
 250. The idea/expression dichotomy emanates from judicial interpretation and is 
codified in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b), which explicitly confers protection upon “original 
works . . . fixed in any tangible medium of expression” and denies protection to “any 
idea . . . regardless of the form in which it is described.” 
 251. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) 
(determining whether something is an “idea” or an “expression of an idea” is 
generally accomplished by gauging the level of detail with which it was rendered). 
 252. See Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1372 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(refusing to extend copyright protection for research because it would amount to 
copyright protection for facts). 
 253. Courts and scholars debate whether the merger doctrine applies to the 
plaintiff’s claim to own a valid copyright or the claim that the defendant’s work is 
infringing.  Compare Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 838 
(10th Cir. 1993) (“Under the merger doctrine, copyright protection is denied to 
expression that is inseparable from or merged with the ideas, processes, or 
discoveries underlying the expression.”) (emphasis added); Kern River Gas 
Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1460 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying the 
merger doctrine to hold that survey maps that the defendant copied from the 
plaintiff were not copyrightable instead of applying the doctrine to hold that the 
maps infringed upon the copyright held by the plaintiff), with Schoolhouse, Inc. v. 
Anderson, 275 F.3d 726, 730 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that the defendant’s website 
did not infringe upon the plaintiff’s magazine, which contained local school 
information, because there was “only one way or only a few ways of expressing [that] 
idea”); Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc., v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(denying relief for alleged copyright infringement where a computer program was 
“the only and essential means of accomplishing a given task,” because in such an 
instance the expression of the idea and the idea had merged) (citation omitted); 
Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that the Second 
Circuit employs the merger doctrine to determine whether a plaintiff’s copyright has 
been infringed upon rather than to determine whether a defendant’s copyright is 
valid). 
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expressive elements that are physically or conceptually separable 
from the functional good.254 
b. Scope 
The scope of rights under copyright is determined in relation to a 
number of context-sensitive standards.  For example, whenever the 
defendant’s work does not literally reproduce the plaintiff’s work, the 
court must resolve whether the two works are “substantially similar” 
from the “ordinary observer’s” perspective.255  Both of these 
judgments are context-sensitive and can be applied to reduce 
uniformity cost.  The most notable example of a court using this 
flexibility is Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,256 which endorsed 
the use of an abstraction-filtration-comparison method for 
determining substantial similarity in software cases.257  Even when 
literal copying takes place, the copyright owner’s rights are limited by 
flexible standards, such as fair use.258  This doctrine is flexible enough 
to grant courts substantial tailoring discretion,259 as are less-frequently-
invoked infringement doctrines such as de minimis use,260 scènes à 
                                                 
 254. See 17 U.S.C. § 113 (codifying the principle set out in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 
201 (1954) that an artist does not lose his or her copyright in an artistic work despite 
the fact that the work is the basis for a functional good).  In addition, the 
uncopyrightable forms of expression identified in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) exclude 
protection for functional literary works, such as certain aspects of software.  See, e.g., 
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that 
a software menu structure that enabled multiple data entries with one “macro” 
keystroke was an uncopyrightable “method of operation”), aff’d by an equally divided 
Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
 255. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2005) (observing that 
copyright infringers seldom copy directly from an existing work and that “direct 
proof” of copyright infringement is rarely available to the court); Incredible Techs., 
Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 2005) (warning that “the 
concept of the ordinary observer must be viewed with caution . . . and [courts] must 
heed the principle that, despite what the ordinary observer might see, the copyright 
laws preclude appropriation of only those elements of the work that are protected by 
the copyright”). 
 256. 982 F.2d at 693. 
 257. See id. at 706-12 (championing the abstraction-filtration-comparison method 
as being rooted in familiar copyright doctrine while being considerate of the reality 
that the software industry is constantly changing and may outpace legal 
developments). 
 258. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (supplying an illustrative list and four factors for courts to 
use when assessing fair use in copyright infringement cases). 
 259. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 
(1985) (asserting that “fair use analysis must always be tailored to the individual case” 
in finding infringement due to unauthorized reproduction of exact portions of 
Gerald Ford’s memoirs). 
 260. See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(defining de minimis use as the appropriation of a copyright that would go 
unrecognized by the average audience); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 
126 F.3d 70, 74-77 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that the defendant’s repeated use of the 
plaintiff’s poster in a television program was a de minimus use of the latter’s 
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faire,261 and the useful article doctrine.  Moreover, courts have license 
to be flexible with the choice of a remedy.262 
CONCLUSION 
The problem of uniformity cost has been recognized but 
underanalyzed in the economic analysis of intellectual property law.  
As the economic importance of information increases and as the 
appropriability conditions in information-production sectors 
continue to become more heterogeneous and complex, the law will 
continue to come under increasing pressure to respond with greater 
context-sensitivity.  However, doing so will be difficult because 
policymakers have limited capacity for aggregating and acting on the 
necessary information about information-production. 
Current law demonstrates use of three policy tools for reducing 
uniformity cost.  Real options, which place conditions on the 
acquisition, enforcement, and maintenance of intellectual property 
rights, reduce the social costs associated with low-value innovations 
and those created under conditions offering appropriability 
alternatives to intellectual property rights.  Deployment of legal 
standards rather than rules along the subject matter and scope 
dimensions of patent and copyright enable more contextual decision 
making to reduce uniformity costs.  More directly, policymakers have 
tailored rights in a number of cases.  Recent trends in international 
law reflect a move to constrain the tailoring discretion of member 
States to the extent that tailoring would reduce the robustness of 
some intellectual property rights.  Notwithstanding this pressure, 
policymakers still retain substantial tailoring discretion and more 
analysis is needed to assess how and when this discretion should be 
exercised. 
 
                                                 
copyright). 
 261. Scènes à faire are otherwise copyright expressive elements that “necessarily 
result from the choice of a setting or situation.”  Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 
F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986).  Because they are unprotected, unauthorized 
reproduction does not constitute infringement.  See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding representation of the 
Hindenburg disaster as non-infringing because of the similarities necessitated by the 
subject matter). 
 262. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2004) (stating that the court’s decision to grant 
injunctive relief is discretionary); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
578 n.10 (1994) (urging lower courts to give due consideration to their discretion to 
grant injunctive relief in parody cases). 
